


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THE
PRINCETON
REVIEW

Edited by Jonas M. Libbey

SIXTIETH YEAR

JANUARY

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
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AGNOSTICISM IN AMERICAN FICTION.

THE new generation of novelists—by which is intended not those who exist merely in the present age, but those who actively belong to it—differ in at least one fundamental respect from the later representatives of the generation preceding them. Thackeray and Dickens concerned themselves not at all about a philosophy of life. With more or less complacency, more or less cynicism, they accepted the religious and social canons which had grown to be the commonplace of the first half of this century. They pictured men and women, not as affected by questions, but as affected by one another. The morality and immorality of their personages were of the old familiar Church-of-England sort; there was no speculation as to whether what had been supposed to be wrong was really right, and *vice versâ*. Such speculations, in various forms and degrees of energy, appear in the world periodically; but the public conscience during the last thirty or forty years had been gradually making itself comfortable after the disturbances consequent upon the French Revolution; the theoretical rights of man had been settled for the moment; and interest was directed no longer to the assertion and support of these rights, but to the social condition and character which were their outcome. Good people were those who climbed through reverses and sorrows towards the conventional heaven; bad people were those who, in spite of worldly and temporary successes and triumphs, gravitated towards the conventional hell. Novels designed on this basis in so far filled the bill, as the phrase is: their greater or less excellence depended solely on the veracity with which the aspect, the temperament, and the conduct of the *dramatis personæ* were reported, and upon the

amount of ingenuity wherewith the web of events and circumstances was woven, and the conclusion reached. Nothing more was expected, and, in general, little or nothing more was attempted. Little more, certainly, will be found in the writings of Thackeray or of Balzac, who, it is commonly admitted, approach nearest to perfection of any novelists of their time. There was nothing genuine or commanding in the metaphysical diletteism of Bulwer; the speculations of Georges Sand are confined within a limited circle, and are the least permanently interesting feature of her writings; and the same might in some measure be affirmed of George Eliot, whose gloomy wisdom finally confesses its inability to do more than advise us rather to bear those ills we have than fly to others that we know not of. As to Nathaniel Hawthorne, he cannot properly be instanced in this connection; for he analyzed chiefly those parts of human nature which remain substantially unaltered in the face of whatever changes of opinion, civilization, and religion. The truth that he brings to light is not the sensational fact of a fashion or a period, but a verity of the human heart, which may foretell, but can never be affected by, anything which that heart may conceive. In other words, Hawthorne belonged neither to this nor to any other generation of writers further than that his productions may be used as a test of the inner veracity of all the rest.

But of late years a new order of things has been coming into vogue, and the new novelists have been among the first to reflect it; and of these the Americans have shown themselves among the most susceptible. Science, or the investigation of the phenomena of existence (in opposition to philosophy, the investigation of the phenomena of being), has proved nature to be so orderly and self-sufficient, and inquiry as to the origin of the primordial atom so unproductive and quixotic, as to make it convenient and indeed reasonable to accept nature as a self-existing fact, and to let all the rest—if rest there be—go. From this point of view, God and a future life retire into the background; not as finally disproved,—because denial, like affirmation, must, in order to be final, be logically supported; and spirit is, if not illogical, at any rate outside the domain of logic,—but as being a hopelessly vague and untrustworthy hypothesis. The

Bible is a human book; Christ was a gentleman, related to the Buddha and Plato families; Joseph was an ill-used man; death, so far as we have any reason to believe, is annihilation of personal existence; life is—the predicament of the body previous to death; morality is the enlightened selfishness of the greatest number; civilization is the compromises men make with one another in order to get the most they can out of the world; wisdom is acknowledgment of these propositions; folly is to hanker after what may lie beyond the sphere of sense. The supporter of these doctrines by no means permits himself to be regarded as a rampant and dogmatic atheist; he is simply the modest and humble doubter of what he cannot prove. He even recognizes the persistence of the religious instinct in man, and caters to it by a new religion suited to the times—the Religion of Humanity. Thus he is secure at all points: for if the religion of the Bible turn out to be true, his disappointment will be an agreeable one; and if it turns out false, he will not be disappointed at all. He is an agnostic—a person bound to be complacent whatever happens. He may indulge a gentle regret, a musing sadness, a smiling pensiveness; but he will never refuse a comfortable dinner, and always wear something soft next his skin, nor can he altogether avoid the consciousness of his intellectual superiority.

Agnosticism, which reaches forward into nihilism on one side and extends back into liberal Christianity on the other, marks, at all events, a definite turning-point from what has been to what is to come. The human mind, in the course of its long journey, is passing through a dark place, and is (as it were) whistling to keep up its courage. It is a period of doubt: what it will result in remains to be seen; but analogy leads us to infer that this doubt, like all others, will be succeeded by a comparatively definite belief in something—no matter what. It is a transient state—the interval between one creed and another. The agnostic no longer holds to what is behind him, nor knows what lies before, so he contents himself with feeling the ground beneath his feet. That at least, tho the heavens fall, is likely to remain; meanwhile, let the heavens take care of themselves. It may be the part of valor to champion Divine revelation, but the better part of valor is discretion, and if Divine revela-

tion prove true, discretion will be none the worse off. On the other hand, to champion a myth is to make one's self ridiculous, and of being ridiculous the agnostic has a consuming fear. From the superhuman disinterestedness of the theory of the Religion of Humanity, before which angels might quail, he flinches not, but when it comes to the risk of being laughed at by certain sagacious persons, he confesses that bravery has its limits. He dares do all that may become an agnostic;—who dares do more is none.

But however open to criticism this phase of thought may be, it is a genuine phase, and the proof is the alarm and the shifts that it has brought about in the opposite camp. "Established" religion finds the foundation of her establishment undermined, and, like the lady in Hamlet's play, she doth protest too much. In another place, all manner of odd superstitions and quasi-miracles are cropping up and gaining credence, as if, since the immortality of the soul cannot be proved by logic, it should be smuggled into belief by fraud and violence—that is, by the testimony of the bodily senses themselves. Taking a comprehensive view of the whole field, therefore, it seems to be divided between discreet and supercilious skepticism on one side, and on the other the clamorous jugglery of charlatanism. The case is not really so bad as that: nihilists are not discreet, and even the Bishop of Rome is not necessarily a charlatan. Nevertheless, the outlook may fairly be described as confused and the issue uncertain. And—to come without further preface to the subject of this paper—it is with this material that the modern novelist, so far as he is a modern and not a future novelist, or a novelist *temporis acti*, has to work. Unless a man have the gift to forecast the years, or at least to catch the first ray of the coming light, he can hardly do better than attend to what is under his nose. He may hesitate to identify himself with agnosticism, but he can scarcely avoid discussing it, either in itself or in its effects. He must entertain its problems; and the personages of his story, if they do not directly advocate or oppose agnostic views, must show in their lives either confirmation or disproof of agnostic principles. It is impossible, save at the cost of affectation or of ignorance, to escape from the spirit of the age. It is in the air we breathe,

and, whether we are fully conscious thereof or not, our lives and thoughts must needs be tintured by it.

Now, art is creative; but Mephistopheles, the spirit that denies, is destructive. A negative attitude of mind is not favorable for the production of works of art. The best periods of art have also been periods of spiritual or philosophical convictions. The more a man doubts, the more he disintegrates and the less he constructs. He has in him no central initial certainty round which all other matters of knowledge or investigation may group themselves in symmetrical relation. He may analyze to his heart's content, but must be wary of organizing. If creation is not of God, if nature is not the expression of the contact between an infinite and a finite being, then the universe and everything in it are accidents, which might have been otherwise or might have not been at all; there is no design in them nor purpose, no divine and eternal significance. This being conceded, what meaning would there be in designing works of art? If art has not its prototype in creation, if all that we see and do is chance, uninspired by a controlling and forming intelligence behind or within it, then to construct a work of art would be to make something arbitrary and grotesque, something unreal and fugitive, something out of accord with the general sense (or nonsense) of things, something with no further basis or warrant than is supplied by the maker's idle and irresponsible fancy. But since no man cares to expend the trained energies of his mind upon the manufacture of toys, it will come to pass (upon the accidental hypothesis of creation) that artists will become shy of justifying their own title. They will adopt the scientific method of merely collecting and describing phenomena; but the phenomena will no longer be arranged as parts or developments of a central controlling idea, because such an arrangement would no longer seem to be founded on the truth: the gratification which it gives to the mind would be deemed illusory, the result of tradition and prejudice; or in other words, what is true being found no longer consistent with what we have been accustomed to call beauty, the latter would cease to be an object of desire, tho something widely alien to it might usurp its name. If beauty be devoid of independent right to be, and definable only as an

attribute of truth, then undoubtedly the cynosure to-day may be the scarecrow of to-morrow, and *vice versâ*, according to our varying conception of what truth is.

And, as a matter of fact, art already shows the effects of the agnostic influence. Artists have begun to doubt whether their old conceptions of beauty be not fanciful and silly. They betray a tendency to eschew the loftier flights of the imagination, and confine themselves to what they call facts. Critics deprecate idealism as something fit only for children, and extol the courage of seeing and representing things as they are. Sculpture is either a stern student of modern trousers and coat-tails or a vapid imitator of classic prototypes. Painters try all manner of experiments, and shrink from painting beneath the surface of their canvas. Much of recent effort in the different branches of art come to us in the form of "studies," but the complete work still delays to be born. We would not so much mind having our old idols and criterions done away with were something new and better, or as good, substituted for them. But apparently nothing definite has yet been decided on. Doubt still reigns, and, once more, doubt is not creative. One of two things must presently happen. The time will come when we must stop saying that we do not know whether or not God, and all that God implies, exists, and affirm definitely and finally either that he does not exist or that he does. That settled, we shall soon see what will become of art. If there is a God, he will be understood and worshipped, not superstitiously and literally as heretofore, but in a new and enlightened spirit; and an art will arise commensurate with this new and loftier revelation. If there is no God, it is difficult to see how art can have the face to show herself any more. There is no place for her in the Religion of Humanity; to be true and living she can be nothing which it has thus far entered into the heart of man to call beautiful; and she could only serve to remind us of certain vague longings and aspirations now proved to be as false as they were vain. Art is not an orchid: it cannot grow in the air. Unless its root can be traced as deep down as Yggdrasil, it will wither and vanish, and be forgotten as it ought to be; and as for the cowslip by the river's brim, a yellow cowslip it shall be, and nothing more; and the light that never was on sea or land

shall be permanently extinguished, in the interests of common sense and economy and (what is least inviting of all to the unregenerate mind) we shall speedily get rid of the notion that we have lost anything worth preserving.

This, however, is only what may be, and our concern at present is with things as they are. It has been observed that American writers have shown themselves more susceptible of the new influences than most others, partly no doubt from a natural sensitiveness of organization, but in some measure also because there are with us no ruts and fetters of old tradition from which we must emancipate ourselves before adopting anything new. We have no past in the European sense, and so are ready for whatever the present or the future may have to suggest. Nevertheless, the novelist who, in a larger degree than any other, seems to be the literary parent of our own best men of fiction, is himself not an American, nor even an Englishman, but a Russian—Turguénieff. His series of extraordinary novels, translated into English and French, is altogether the most important fact in the literature of fiction of the last twelve years. To read his books you would scarcely imagine that their author could have had any knowledge of the work of his predecessors in the same field. Originality is a term indiscriminately applied, and generally of trifling significance, but so far as any writer may be original, Turguénieff is so. He is no less original in the general scheme and treatment of his stories than in their details. Whatever he produces has the air of being the outcome of his personal experience and observation. He even describes his characters, their aspect, features, and ruling traits, in a novel and memorable manner. He seizes on them from a new point of vantage, and uses scarcely any of the hackneyed and conventional devices for bringing his portraits before our minds; yet no writer, not even Carlyle, has been more vivid, graphic, and illuminating than he. Here are eyes that owe nothing to other eyes, but examine and record for themselves. Having once taken up a character he never loses his grasp on it: on the contrary, he masters it more and more, and only lets go of it when the last recesses of its organism have been explored. In the quality and conduct of his plots he is equally unprecedented. His scenes are

modern, and embody characteristic events and problems in the recent history of Russia. There is in their arrangement no attempt at symmetry, poetic justice, or artistic balance. Temperament and circumstances are made to rule, and against their merciless fiat no appeal is allowed. Evil does evil to the end; weakness never gathers strength; even goodness never varies from its level: it suffers, but is not corrupted; it is the goodness of instinct, not of struggle and aspiration; it happens to belong to this or that person, just as his hair happens to be black or brown. Everything in the surroundings and the action is to the last degree matter-of-fact, commonplace, inevitable; there are no picturesque coincidences, no providential interferences, no desperate victories over fate; the tale, like the world of the materialist, moves onward from a predetermined beginning to a helpless and tragic close. And yet few books have been written of deeper and more permanent fascination than these. Their grim veracity; the creative sympathy and steady dispassionateness of their portrayal of mankind: their constancy of motive, and their sombre earnestness, have been surpassed by none. This earnestness is worth dwelling upon for a moment. It bears no likeness to the dogmatism of the bigot or the fanaticism of the enthusiast. It is the concentration of a broadly-gifted masculine mind, devoting its unstinted energies to depicting certain aspects of society and civilization, which are powerfully representative of the tendencies of the day. "Here is the unvarnished fact—give heed to it!" is the unwritten motto. The author avoids betraying, either explicitly or implicitly, the tendency of his own sympathies; not because he fears to have them known, but because he holds it to be his office simply to portray, and to leave judgment thereupon where, in any case, it must ultimately rest—with the world of his readers. He tells us what is; it is for us to consider whether it also must be and shall be. Turguénieff is an artist by nature, yet his books are not works of art: they are fragments of history, differing from real life only in presenting such persons and events as are commandingly and exhaustively typical, and excluding all others. This faculty of selection is one of the highest artistic faculties, and it appears as much in the minor as in the major features of the narrative. It indicates that Turguénieff might, if he chose, produce a story as

faultlessly symmetrical as was ever framed. Why then does he not so choose? The reason can only be that he deems the truth-seeming of his narrative would thereby be impaired. "He is only telling a story," the reader will say, "and he shapes the events and persons so as to fit the plot." But is this reason reasonable? To those who believe that God has no hand in the ordering of human affairs, it undoubtedly is reasonable. To those who believe the contrary, however, it appears as if the story of no human life or complex of lives could be otherwise than a rounded and perfect work of art—provided only that the spectator takes note, not of the superficial accidents and appearances, but of the underlying Divine purpose and significance. The absence of this recognition in Turguénieff's novels is the explanation of them: holding the creed their author does, he could not have written them otherwise; and, on the other hand, had his creed been different, he very likely would not have written novels at all.

The pioneer in whatever field of thought or activity is apt to be also the most distinguished figure therein. The consciousness of being the first augments the keenness of his impressions, and a mind that can see and report in advance of others a new order of things may claim a finer organization than the ordinary. The vitality of nature animates him who has insight to discern her at first hand, whereas his followers miss the freshness of the morning, because instead of discovering they must be content to illustrate and refine. Those of our writers who betray Turguénieff's influence are possibly his superiors in finish and culture, but their faculty of convincing and presenting is less. Their interest in their own work seems less serious than his; they may entertain us more, but they do not move and magnetize so much. The persons and events of their stories are conscientiously studied, and are nothing if not natural; but they lack distinction. In an epitome of life so concise as the longest novel must needs be, to use any but types is waste of time and space. A typical character is one who combines the traits or beliefs of a certain class to which is he affiliated—who is, practically, all of them and himself besides; and when we know him there is nothing left worth knowing about the others. In Shakespeare's Hamlet and Enobarbus, in Fielding's Squire Western, in Walter

Scott's Edie Ochiltree and Meg Merrilies, in Balzac's Père Goriot and Madame Marneff, in Thackeray's Colonel Newcome and Becky Sharp, in Turguéneff's Bazarof and Dimitri Roudine, we meet persons who exhaust for us the groups to which they severally belong. Bazarof, the nihilist, for instance, reveals to us the motives and influences that have made nihilism, so that we feel nothing essential on that score remains to be learnt.

The ability to recognize and select types is a test of a novelist's talent and experience. It implies energy to rise above the blind walls of one's private circle of acquaintance; the power to perceive what phases of thought and existence are to be represented as well as who represents them; the sagacity to analyze the age or the moment and reproduce its dominant features. The feat is difficult, and when done by no means blows its own trumpet. On the contrary, the reader must open his eyes to be aware of it. He finds the story clear and easy of comprehension, the characters come home to him familiarly and remain distinctly in his memory, he understands something which was till now vague to him, but he is as likely to ascribe this to an exceptional lucidity in his own mental condition as to any special merit in the author. Indeed, it often happens that the author who puts out-of-the-way personages into his stories—characters that represent nothing but themselves, or possibly some eccentricity of invention on their author's part, will gain the latter a reputation for cleverness higher than his fellow's who portrays mankind in its masses as well as in its details. But the finest imagination is not that which evolves strange images, but that which explains seeming contradictions, and reveals the unity within the difference and the harmony beneath the discord.

The number of our recent novelists who have achieved anything that seems of moment is almost remarkably small. Mr. Bret Harte scarcely enters into our present category, his brilliant genius, like that of Dickens, being mainly devoted to illustrating the already familiar proposition that immoral and uncultivated persons may upon occasion display delicacy of feeling and self-abnegating virtue. He formulates a strenuous protest against phariseism; but Turgénéieff begins where Harte leaves

off. Still less need we instance Theodore Winthrop, who might have become one of our most important figures, but who at the time of his death had only attempted (in a style that lacked repose and simplicity) to animate the prosaic facts of modern life with the romance of mediæval and chivalrous times. The last new story-teller, the author of "Mr. Isaacs," seems to have undertaken a somewhat similar enterprise, and the emphatic popularity of his little books reminds us of the success of "Cecil Dreeme" and "John Brent." Side by side with him comes Mr. A. S. Hardy, whose touching and graceful story is French in its scene, in its style, in its dialogue, and in the names given to its characters; but the characters themselves and the sentiment are American. Neither these gentlemen, however, nor such agreeable writers as Mr. Boyesen, Mr. Bishop, Mr. Lathrop, and Mr. Fawcett can be called epoch-making; the iron of the new age has not fully entered into their souls, and they are not explicitly either for it or against it. The discoverer of "Uncle Remus" has, however, lately shown gifts which may, by and by raise him to an eminence among us which would astonish no one except himself; and the biographer of "The Grandissimes" has made Louisiana one of the most charming States in literature. As for the ladies who have honored our literature by their contributions, it will perhaps be well to adopt regarding them a course analogous to that which Napoleon is said to have pursued with the letters sent to him while in Italy. He left them unread until a certain time had elapsed, and then found that most of them no longer needed attention. We are thus brought face to face with the two men with whom every critic of American novelists has to reckon; who represent what is carefullest and newest in American fiction; and it remains to inquire how far their work has been moulded by the skeptical or radical spirit of which Turguénieff is the chief exemplar.

The author of "Daisy Miller" had been writing for several years before the bearings of his course could be confidently calculated. Some of his earlier tales,—as, for example, "The Madonna of the Future,"—while keeping near reality on one side, are on the other eminently fanciful and ideal. He seemed to feel the attraction of fairyland, but to lack resolution to swallow it whole; so instead of idealizing both persons and plot,

as Hawthorne had ventured to do, he tried to persuade real persons to work out an ideal destiny. But the tact, delicacy, and reticence with which these attempts were made did not blind him to the essential incongruity; either realism or idealism had to go, and step by step he dismissed the latter, until at length Turguénieff's current caught him. By this time, however, his culture had become too wide and his independent views too confirmed to admit of his yielding unconditionally to the great Russian. Especially his critical familiarity with French literature operated to broaden, if at the same time to render less trenchant, his method and expression. His characters are drawn with fastidious care, and closely follow the tones and fashions of real life. Each utterance is so exactly like what it ought to be, that the reader feels the same sort of pleased surprise as is afforded by a phonograph which repeats, with all the accidental pauses and inflections, the speech spoken into it. Yet the words come through a medium; they are not quite spontaneous; these figures have not the sad, human inevitableness of Turguénieff's people. The reason seems to be (leaving the difference between the genius of the two writers out of account) that the American, unlike the Russian, recognizes no tragic importance in the situation. To the latter, the vision of life is so ominous that his voice waxes sonorous and terrible, his eyes, made keen by foreboding, see the leading elements of the conflict, and them only; he is no idle singer of an empty day, but he speaks because speech springs out of him. To his mind the foundations of human welfare are in jeopardy, and it is full time to decide what means may avert the danger. But the American does not think any cataclysm is impending, or if any there be, nobody can help it. The subjects that best repay attention are the minor ones of civilization, culture, behavior; how to avoid certain vulgarities and follies, how to inculcate certain principles: and to illustrate these points heroic types are not needed. In other words, the situation being unheroic, so must the actors be, for, apart from the inspirations of circumstances, Napoleon no more than John Smith is recognizable as a hero.

Now, in adopting this view, a writer places himself under several manifest disadvantages. If you are to be an agnostic, it

is better (for novel-writing purposes) not to be a complacent or resigned one. Otherwise your characters will find it difficult to show what is in them. A man reveals and classifies himself in proportion to the severity of the condition or action required of him; hence the American novelist's people are in considerable straits to make themselves adequately known to us. They cannot lay bare their inmost soul over a cup of tea or a picture by Corôť; so, in order to explain themselves, they must not only submit to dissection at the author's hands, but must also devote no little time and ingenuity to dissecting themselves and one another. But dissection is one thing, and the living word rank from the heart and absolutely reeking of the human creature that uttered it—the word that Turguénieff's people are constantly uttering—is another. Moreover, in the dearth of commanding traits and stirring events, there is a continual temptation to magnify those which are petty and insignificant. Instead of a telescope to sweep the heavens, we are furnished with a microscope to detect infusoria. We want a description of a mountain; and instead of receiving an outline, naked and severe perhaps, but true and impressive, we are introduced to a tiny field on its immeasurable side, and we go botanizing and insect-hunting there. This is realism; but it is the realism of texture, not of form and relation. It encourages our glance to be near-sighted instead of comprehensive. Above all, there is a misgiving that we do not touch the writer's true quality, and that these scenes of his, so elaborately and conscientiously prepared, have cost him much thought and pains, but not one throb of the heart or throe of the spirit. The experiences that he depicts have not, one fancies, marked wrinkles on his forehead or turned his hair gray. There are two kinds of reserve—the reserve which feels that its message is too mighty for it, and the reserve which feels that it is too mighty for its message. Our new school of writers is reserved, but its reserve does not strike one as being of the former kind.

And yet Mr. James and Mr. Howells have done more than all the rest of us to make our literature respectable during the last ten years. If texture be the object, they have brought texture to a fineness never surpassed anywhere. They have discovered charm and grace in much that was only blank before.

They have detected and described points of human nature hitherto unnoticed, which, if not intrinsically important, will one day be made auxiliary to the production of pictures of broader as well as minuter veracity than have heretofore been produced. All that seems wanting thus far is a direction, an aim, a belief. Agnosticism has brought about a pause for a while, and no doubt a pause is preferable to some kinds of activity. It may enable us, when the time comes to set forward again, to do so with better equipment and more intelligent purpose. It will not do to be always at a prophetic heat of enthusiasm, sympathy, denunciation: the coolly critical mood is also useful to prune extravagance and promote a sense of responsibility. The novels of Mr. James and of Mr. Howells have taught us that men and women are creatures of infinitely complicated structure, and that even the least of these complications, if it is portrayed at all, is worth portraying truthfully. But we cannot forget, on the other hand, that honest emotion and hearty action are necessary to the wholesomeness of society, because in their absence society is afflicted with a lamentable sameness and triviality; the old primitive impulses remain, but the food on which they are compelled to feed is insipid and unsustaining; our eyes are turned inward instead of outward, and each one of us becomes himself the Rome towards which all his roads lead. Such books as these authors have written are not the Great American Novel, because they take life and humanity not in their loftier, but in their lesser manifestations. They are the side scenes and the background of a story that has yet to be written. That story will have the interest not only of the collision of private passions and efforts, but of the great ideas and principles which characterize and animate a nation. It will discriminate between what is accidental and what is permanent, between what is realistic and what is real, between what is sentimental and what is sentiment. It will show us not only what we are, but what we are to be; not only what to avoid, but what to do. It will rest neither in the tragic gloom of Turguénieff, nor in the critical composure of James, nor in the gentle deprecation of Howells, but will demonstrate that the weakness of man is the motive and condition of his strength. It will not shrink from romance, nor

from ideality, nor from artistic completeness, because it will know at what depths and heights of life these elements are truly operative. It will be American, not because its scene is laid or its characters born in the United States, but because its burden will be reaction against old tyrannies and exposure of new hypocrisies; a refutation of respectable falsehoods, and a proclamation of unsophisticated truths. Indeed, let us take heed and diligently improve our native talent, lest a day come when the Great American Novel make its appearance, but written in a foreign language, and by some author who—however purely American at heart—never set foot on the shores of the Republic.

The aim of this paper has not been to express an opinion as to the merits of our writers, but to inquire whether, in the light of the recent results of social and scientific changes, their work is likely to be complete and final in itself, or merely preparatory and experimental. That it is good of its kind no one doubts, but whether its category be that of the bricklayer or the architect remains to be proved.

JULIAN HAWTHORNE.

ON THE EDUCATION OF STATESMEN.

THE thoughts that find expression in the following pages were suggested by the experiment which some of our more prominent institutions of learning have undertaken, of providing extended courses of instruction in the Political Sciences. In two of these institutions separate faculties have been established and Schools of Political Science formally announced; in another a four years' course upon History and Political Science, corresponding in all respects, so far as grade is concerned, to other academic courses, has been prepared; while at other centres of learning such liberty of choice in the selection of studies is allowed and such rich and extended courses prepared that the same end is practically achieved.

These steps indicate the tendency of thought among those who are giving direction to the educational policy of this country. They show that boards of control admit as desirable and regard as feasible technical and extended instruction in the Political Sciences. It must therefore be of some interest, and we trust not inappropriate, to inquire respecting the basis of such a decision, and to this simple inquiry will the thought of the present article be confined. The reader then need expect no discussion in technical pedagogics; questions of organization, of courses of study, of the true harmony between this and other lines of education, and the like, are purposely set one side. Assuming rather that these questions have been wisely answered, the fundamental query still remains: Have our educators any rational basis for this present movement? Are schools for higher education in the Political Sciences, the factors of public life being what they are, destined to failure or success? Is this scheme practicable in a Republican government and

among peoples of decided democratic tendencies? Another question also lies bound up with these. Granting the possibility of success, what is the mental attitude which instructors must bring to their work, and what the spirit that must be infused into the students who come under their instruction, in order to achieve this success? The form itself of these questions, which all will admit as pertinent, implies the presence of serious difficulties. As, however, in any struggle the best armor is a knowledge of the strong points of one's opponent, so in this case there is no more pertinent preparation for aggressive work than a thorough acquaintance with the embarrassments to be encountered.

But before proceeding to a consideration of these difficulties, it may be well to ask what is meant by success. For some undertakings there are gradations in the success that may be achieved, but in this case until a certain foothold is gained there is no room for a comparative estimate. The situation must be mastered or defeat acknowledged. Success here cannot be measured by the effect of the courses pursued upon the mental growth of the students, for if mental development be all that is required, there is no reason in departing from the old and tried curriculum, the facilities for which are already provided and which is comparatively less expensive. The education here considered is technical as well as disciplinary, and, like all technical studies, is to be judged by its results outside the student. A school of engineering that does not provide better bridges and buildings is a failure; so a School of Political Science that does not make itself felt in the life of the State cannot be said to have achieved success. In the degree of influence they exert in public life, there may be gradations, but until that influence is exerted in some degree these courses of instruction will not have proved their right to be. The question for study now lies clearly before us.

The difficulty which first occurs to one at all familiar with matters of education lies in the fact that these studies lead neither to a remunerative profession nor to any recognized social standing. Being technical as well as disciplinary, and being of such a character that some maturity of mind is required for their pursuance, thus claiming in part those years usually

given to a preparation for professional life, it is quite doubtful if large numbers of young men can be induced to take them up in a thorough manner. An analysis of this difficulty, however, leads to a question of university organization, and as such lies outside our present purpose. Moreover, it has received the careful attention of those under whose control this new departure in education has been set on foot; as a result, several plans have been adopted, in principle perhaps the same yet in form quite distinct, by which it is hoped that this obstacle may be overcome. It will be therefore but a manifestation of due deference to class this difficulty as an embarrassment rather than an obstacle.

A second and much more serious difficulty is found in the unattractiveness of public life in the United States to men of high culture and broad attainments. It therefore fails to draw from private pursuits those who are the most capable of uniting in their own person high scholarship and true statesmanship. While this remains true, there is no guarantee that young men, even tho they have prepared themselves by careful study for public trusts, will care to enter public life. How, then, can one hope that an education in the Political Sciences will come to influence State policies?

This introduces a question exceedingly interesting, independently of the relation it bears to the discussion in hand. Why is it that in a Republic, among self-governing people, the best talent, the most carefully trained intellects, and the most highly developed judgments are, as a rule, to be found outside the State service?

In following out the thoughts suggested by this question, no direct reference will be made to the condition of the civil service, which necessitates the adoption of corrupt means for the maintenance of one's position as the representative of a large constituency; nor indeed to party bribery at elections, where the suffrage of large numbers of voters is openly regarded as merchandise. These are indeed evils, and must rasp the sensibilities of men of honesty, culture, and refinement. Yet evils of this sort are, in some form or other, necessary attendants upon the practical workings of all governments. Nor again does the difficulty here considered include what is termed the harshness

of public life. Stern measures, strong personal feelings, severe criticisms, and promiscuous contact with men, ever have and probably ever will make part of a public career; but these facts can never deter a strong man from entering public life. At least these are universal conditions of political activity, and must be accepted as elements in the problem to be solved.

Omitting, then, these palpable considerations, attention is drawn to another and deeper explanation of this fact. This explanation applies primarily to the condition of affairs in the United States. It may not be easily perceived when stated. Indeed, it may fail entirely of recognition, except by those who, out of the experience of their own growth, are enabled to feel the charm of personal independence and to understand, by possessing it, that culture which arises from the higher education.

A comparative study of the possible sphere of activity open to statesmen will disclose certain limitations imposed upon public leaders in this country which are not elsewhere known. These limitations are imposed by the working of parties under the constitutions of our National and State governments, as well as by the political customs into which this people have fallen. When one studies the Constitution of the United States, the first lesson learned is, that the safety of popular liberty depends upon the separation of the governmental functions. If he inquire how liberty is thus conserved, he is quickly answered, that, since it is made impossible for all the functions of government to be deposited in the hands of a single person, personal government is no longer to be feared.

While we remember that union among these States was born of a struggle against illegal usurpation of individual power, we can, as historical students, explain the importance which the statesmen of an hundred years ago attached to this safeguard against personal rule; yet this should not blind us to the evils of irresponsible administration, which is itself a result of the separation of the functions of government. It is true that at the present time there is no danger of the establishment of personal government, except it come through the Napoleonization of politics; but can one unreservedly congratulate his country upon the class of men and grade of ideas that, under impersonal irresponsible administration, come to the front? Under the

rule of irresponsibility, there is no guarantee that real power lies with those honored with the highest offices. Indeed, it not unfrequently occurs that personal or intellectual strength is a positive detriment to a candidate. Under such conditions, the men to whom politics are fascinating are either those who rejoice in the sense of power without its responsibilities, or—what is yet more to be deprecated—those who rejoice in the appearance of power with neither its reality nor its responsibility, still who for sake of the show are willing to serve as puppets to men of the former class. They who under such conditions may be induced to enter political life are, for the most part, inferior to those who come to the front under the *régime* of personal responsibility.

During what may be termed the formative period in the life of this Republic, the importance of the themes discussed served to bring some of the talent of the country to bear upon public administration, yet even then there was more often the appearance than the reality of great statesmanship. If one compare the spirit which rules in English public life with that which for the most part has controlled in this country, and then consider the difference in constitutional forms, it is believed that he will recognize the application of these remarks.

Another thought in this connection is that under irresponsible party government it becomes necessary for one who would achieve public recognition to merge his individuality into a great organization, practically secret in its deliberation and workings. The power of this organization is such that no man can, as a man of practical sense, hope for an election upon the merits of any question in opposition to its wishes. That focalizing of happy accidents, which secures to a candidate an independent election is very rare. Yet this power of party rests upon the fact that a party can promise anything and be held to the fulfilment of nothing. Its head is nowhere. The party catechism defines a perfect candidate as one who can keep his mouth shut or, if he open it, will say nothing. There is no such thing in this country as responsible leadership of party, and its absence, together with all its absence implies, goes far in explaining why the best talent of this country is not procurable for the public service. In England and France a different state

of affairs exists. In England especially does one observe public life to be attractive to the most highly trained intellects. The leadership of both the government and the opposition is a position of apparent power, of actual power, and of power joined to personal responsibility. It affrights an inferior man; it lures a powerful man. To fill either place gives full scope to the entirety of a statesman's talents, and satisfies the inherent sense of dignity which every public administrator ought to feel. The same is true of all members of the government, especially in France, where a minister may fall independently of the Cabinet of which he is a member. The same spirit permeates the ranks of the parties, and it is quite natural that, under such conditions, public life should be attractive to men of the highest order of talent and culture.

A still further explanation of the fact that the public service of the United States fails to draw the best talent, and in consequence that young men of good parts who have followed thorough courses in political science may find themselves without congenial occupation, is disclosed when we observe that the prevalent conception of the State in this country lacks entirely the element of dignity. The popular estimate of public service is low, and be this estimate correct or not, it is yet effective in rendering a political career unattractive to the highest grade of intellect. Nor indeed is it to the point to say that the character of the public servants necessitates a low appreciation of their service, for this, so far as it be true, is itself a part of the state of things to be explained. This condition of affairs may be referred to no single cause, but an influential causal antecedent may be found in the doctrine of State functions that came to the front with Jacksonian democracy. This doctrine restricted the State to negative duties: it is commonly known by the name *laissez faire*. It was adopted by the American people as the rule of their government, but such is its nature that no people can put into practice the doctrine of letting things run themselves without growing into an undignified form of State life. Wherever State powers are reduced to the narrowest possible limits, popular sentiment will as a natural consequence grade private initiative and private control above State functions, and as long as this estimate continues, one cannot hope that the best talent will

be placed at the service of the public. The best men of the country will always address themselves to those occupations where actual power resides, for true men are not caught by show.

If my meaning has been made plain it will appear that a higher political education can with difficulty flourish among a people that has adopted *laissez-faire* as the maxim of control in its public policy, for all thought among such a people is practically to effect a negation of activity. In this fact is found the philosophic explanation of the absence of any great administrative genius among statesmen since the day of Albert Gallatin. The present, however, affords some evidence that this restrictive policy is losing its power over men's minds, and as its influence recedes may we hope that education and talent and genius can be induced to enter the service of the State. Certain it is that with the comprehensive conception of government there must come greater actuality of power to the public servant and greater dignity to the State itself. In our optimism, therefore, we may at least go so far as to recognize that there is some reason in accepting the present as especially opportune for undertaking systematic political education. The tendency of both sentiment and events is such as will require greater knowledge of the technicalities of public life, a wider study of the methods of control, and a more extended development of administrative talent. This is the growing demand. It makes no difference whether this be a conscious demand on the part of the public or not; it is real, and upon it may this educational experiment find standing ground. But in addition to this, the nature of public questions is changing, and a different sort of preparation from that which heretofore has been regarded as sufficient is now required. The questions that have claimed especial attention during the century of national life past have been for the most part in connection with constitutional interpretation. It was appropriate that such discussions should be passed over to lawyers, as lying especially in their province. This being the case, it was natural also that a study of the law should be regarded as an adequate preparation for public life. Now, however, we are for the most part done with constitutional interpretation. The pressing questions of to-day deal with the direction and form of national growth in the future, and not with the form of national

organization expressed in any given instrument. For this the reading of law is not sufficient. It will give neither the knowledge nor the bent of mind necessary for taking the lead in coming discussions. The preparation now required will be found in an exhaustive comparative study of history. This alone can give that grasp over the forces in human society and that insight into the law of social development which must characterize the statesmen of the next generation. The fact that these schools of political science have recognized this truth and have made history the basis of their instruction, shows more than anything else that they are in harmony with the forces of the day.

What, then, can be said? Is public life in this country so unattractive as to quench all enthusiasm for a study of general politics? Are the petty restrictions upon a public career so annoying and the sphere of possible power so narrow that the best talent will always be devoted to other pursuits? This obstacle to the quick success of political education exists, but is not insurmountable. In the observed decay of the restrictive theory of government there is ground for hope, and in the necessity for some adequate solution to dangerous public and social problems there is material for deep scholarly enthusiasm. A consideration of these difficulties, however, points a sure lesson to those who would give instruction in the political sciences. Success for their work requires that they exalt the idea of the State. They must point out that the State is in the highest sense the expression of the life of the people, and that he who succeeds in impressing his personality upon it moulds the environment in which character is developed, for thus they show that men may worthily devote intellect and power to the public service. It also lies in their province to define the questions pressing for solution, and awaken in the minds of those with whom they come in contact the enthusiasm of great ideas born of great necessities. Such an enthusiasm is subject to no laws but those of its own making, and may overcome all adverse conditions. Perhaps, after all, the surest evidence that education in the political sciences can attain its purpose is the fact of the almost simultaneous appearance at so many centres of learning of the facilities for procuring it.

Thus far in our discussion of the expediency of political education, those facts alone have been considered which tend to deter men from a thorough preparation for public life or from entering it when prepared. There is, however, another side to this question. Not only must trained men be willing to enter public life, but the voters must be willing to have them do so.

It is an easy thing to point out the truism that a self-governing people should be educated in those branches of knowledge pertaining to government. Yet it is quite another matter to derive from this as a major premise a complete defence for Schools of Political Science. The difficulty lies in the second premise of the syllogism, which is nothing less than the totality of existing facts, including the ignorance, the prejudices, and the class interests of those upon whom the government ultimately rests. It must not be forgotten that this is a democratic country, and that popular sentiment in one's favor, no matter how created, is the only support for a public career. The one great question for political educators is: What form of instruction may be undertaken which will lead students to grasp high ideals of State life and yet not destroy their power over the community whose support they will be called upon to seek? This question must be answered before the scholarly element can be infused into public life. In what has been written upon political education, I do not remember a single endeavor to bridge over this gap. Yet this feat of engineering must be accomplished or the position of those who undertake such education will be like men who train warriors on one side of an impassable chasm while the field of battle lies upon the other.

It will be noticed that the position here assumed, as indeed throughout the discussion, is extreme. No amnesty of thought is concluded with those who concede that a study of History, Jurisprudence, and Economy may appropriately form part of a general education, while denying that they who have followed such courses are any better prepared to direct public policies than they who have not; on the contrary, it is held that these studies are desirable from the standpoint of a technical as well as of a general education. It is assumed that certain courses of study must have a tendency to develop the mental attitude and intellectual grasp of a statesman, and that until this training

may be utilized in public administration the schools providing it will not have attained their highest possible success.

Reduced, then, to a single phrase, the difficulty here presented is that of prejudice against scholarship in public life. An analysis of this sentiment will, it is believed, show it to be in part real and well founded, in part, however, imaginary; it will also disclose criticisms upon those who the most strenuously urge their own claims to scholarship as well as upon those who entertain the prejudices.

There are three separate classes that come naturally to mind in this connection.

In the first class are to be found those who now control public affairs, but whose control rests upon something besides public confidence inspired by personal worth. The second class is composed of those business men the success of whose undertakings depends upon special legislation in their favor. This includes by no means all engaged in industrial pursuits, yet the desire for trade-legislation among those interested is so strong, that it permeates more or less the entire profit-making community. The vast numbers which go to make up the third class are called, merely for convenience, the masses—a class which every one believes to exist, but which no one is able to define. As used here, the word is intended merely to describe those whose ordinary income arises neither from property nor from that kind of education which brings with it social position.

Of the three classes here considered, the one from whose prejudice the least instruction may be drawn in giving shape and tone to the desired political education, yet perhaps the one whose opposition is the most apparent and natural, is that of the patronage politician. So far as the men now controlling public affairs are themselves imbued with the scholarly spirit, the attempt to reënforce this element of control must meet with approval and encouragement. Such men have nothing to lose by an increased intensity in public life of the spirit which they already represent. The fact, however, with large numbers of public men is that the power which they wield and their ability to keep themselves in office rests upon the distribution of patronage and not upon any rational sentiment of the people in their favor. While this continues, it will be impossible to realize high

ideals of government, and any effort in that direction will meet with discouragement from men so situated. For, even tho a man of honest merit be by some accident elected to represent a constituency where large patronage exists, he will quickly discover that he must give up his meritoriousness or retire to private life. A poor civil service and a high grade of statesmanship cannot exist at the same time; nor can any organized effort to prepare young men for public trusts meet with encouragement from public men whose power will disappear with the birth of a pure civil service. Did any one ever inquire why the State of New York, embracing among her citizens men of the highest talent and men capable of taking rank with the greatest publicists, has now for years failed to present the nation with statesmanlike counsels? The insignificant State of Vermont, on the other hand, becomes a significant and powerful factor in the deliberations of the nation, and leaves her proud mark in legislative records. Has New York degenerated while Vermont has developed? This but states again the query, it does not answer the question. The explanation lies rather in the fact that one who represents a small State where there is little patronage has time and energy, which one who represents a large State has not, to develop and exercise in the service of the nation statesmanlike qualities. While such a condition of things lasts, while many men holding municipal, State, and National offices are exercising an authority which does not primarily rest upon a public sentiment growing out of confidence in themselves, but rather upon a distribution of patronage, it must follow that any endeavor which looks toward a change in the basis of that authority, which if successful would deprive them of their power, will arouse their suspicion, their prejudice, and their opposition. There is no rational basis of interest for such men in any effort whatever that looks toward the placing of public life upon a higher level of thought and action. Yet this ought not to be a source of discouragement. It presents an obstacle truly, but one the recognition of which brings with it a stronger purpose. Moreover, those engaged in this educational effort may look with confidence for support from all who are interested in civil-service reform, and even among public men these are by no means few in number. Of

the sympathy of educators in this reform movement there can be no question, for until a pure civil service shall have been established, they must work in vain for the full accomplishment of what they endeavored. Here again does this higher political education show itself to be in harmony with what is newest and to stand in line with the forces now coming to the front. In this there is encouragement.

The second class of prejudices against the spirit of control in public life, which the higher political education would tend to introduce, is observed when one studies the customary methods of thought among business men. A consideration of the ground upon which their prejudice rests brings to light a condition of affairs much more serious in themselves than those just passed in review, and calling for a far more delicate treatment than was regarded necessary in the case of what may be termed patronage-opposition. Its serious aspect arises from the fact that this prejudice grows directly out of personal self-interest, which in business life has come to be regarded as providing an ultimate rule of ethics ; while the delicacy with which it must be handled is due to an unwarranted egoism on the part of both men of books and men of business, which renders difficult mutual appreciation and understanding.

Men of affairs appear not unfrequently to urge their claim upon nineteenth-century civilization as tho they held a first mortgage upon it. This, they say, is a business civilization rather than one of thought. We, the business men, apply the motive-power to the wheels of industry. To our activity and energy is due all subjection of natural forces, and all organization of human labor, which marks this age as one of material comforts and great possibilities. The society now formed is preëminently a business society, and on that account its management should be handed over to business men. The criterion of success and basis of judgment applicable to private affairs, they continue, should be adopted in affairs of legislation. All public questions are directly or indirectly business questions, and men out of business have no standing ground for interference.

On the other hand, men who do not look at matters of public concern from this class standpoint fail to perceive the

justice of being assigned thus to a subordinate position. They recognize the fact that the predominant thought of this century is bent on business, that the test quite generally accepted for success or failure is size of capital fund, number of laborers controlled, price of real estate, rate of profit, and the like. They fully appreciate the wonderful power of the present age, and gladly admit that to gain supremacy over natural forces indicates a higher grade of civilization than to strive, as did the Romans for example, for extended sway over peoples. But at the same time they cannot see in all this a sufficient end of living. They refuse, therefore, to be satisfied with the rate of profit arising from any given act as sufficient proof of its goodness or badness. They wish to go behind the price of real estate for a rule of judgment. They hold that there is such a thing as a self-conditioned social organism in which character is formed, and that the rational development of this organism should be the purpose of rational beings. They find in the application of nineteenth-century methods to the realization of the highest ideals of a perfect society the only proper test for public acts.

It is not intended to say that all men engaged in business are actuated by that which for a better name is here termed the business spirit, nor that all men engaged in education would find themselves in harmony with the second method of viewing public questions; but it is claimed that there do exist these two mental attitudes at variance with each other, and that those who undertake political education must, in order to have any standing ground whatever, assume the broad basis of judgment.

A closer examination of this prejudice shows that there lies in the business mind a sense of necessary incongruity between theory and practice, sufficient testimony to the fact being found in the usual manner in which the words are employed. So far as the abstract question is concerned, a student cannot recognize that there exists any natural antagonism between what is theoretical and what is practical. He must maintain that, in thought at least, there is harmony between them or abandon his claim to scholarship. A theory is merely an explanation of observed facts. It may be incorrect, it may be incomplete, in which case its attempted application will lead to failure, but to

assume to act independently of premises which theory alone can afford is irrational. All intelligent legislation, for example, must proceed upon the basis of what for the time being is believed to be the explanation of relations existing between the forces employed. The only logical position for any one who distrusts a proposed legislative enactment is to attack the theoretical or explanatory considerations upon which it rests, and not, while their truth is admitted, deny that the law will work in practice.

With such statements as these it is quite probable there will be no disagreement ; that, however, does not cause the difficulty to disappear, but only indicates the heart of the matter to remain untouched, and shows that what goes under the name of antagonism between theory and practice is not at all what in reality is meant. It is between broad rules of judgment and practical maxims of particular forms of business that the essence of the difficulty lies. A man of affairs urges that none but members of his class ought to undertake legislation touching industries, because they alone know the technicalities of business. Students of society, on the other hand, hold that technical legislation of this kind is the worst of all legislation, because it must be class legislation. Class legislation is admissible only where there is a single interest at stake, and that, in a complex society, is never the case. These words practical and theoretical are meaningless in popular discussion. They are like orthodoxy and heterodoxy: a person must stand behind them to give them meaning. Every man regards that as practical, judging from the common use of the word, which makes a profit in his own business, while that is impractical—theoretical—which curtails his particular profit. The desirability of a public policy formed upon the basis of general interest, rather than one resulting from the survival of the strongest interest, is the convincing argument in favor of political education, for in this manner only can that sentiment be created by which the great possibilities of this century may be realized for all. It need not be apprehended, however, from the natural antagonism between broad policy and particular interests, that those who essay political education will fail entirely of the sympathy of the business portion of the community. This will only be necessarily the case

where the business carried on is out of harmony with the highest interests of the social body. For all undertakings growing out of normal conditions, the individual and the general interest will coincide. It rests with scholars themselves to gain the confidence of those managing such industries, and this they can do by showing such an appreciation of business activity that their judgments may be regarded as sound and their purposes attainable. Upon no other basis do they deserve confidence.

It is seldom the case that a deep-seated prejudice discloses criticism upon one of the parties concerned only, and certainly the question here in controversy presents no exception. The temptation to which students are especially liable is to forget that actual conditions temper principles, and it is because they forget this fact that they have brought upon themselves the name of Theorists. Of the various studies embraced in a political education, that of Political Economy is perhaps open to the severest censure in this regard. This science has been especially guilty of not holding strictly to verities in its processes of reasoning, and on this account it has lost much of its old-time authority. The course of legislation of late years has offered it many indignities by refusing to recognize its "principles" as authoritative. This may be interpreted as the natural result of having adopted false methods in economic study; or one may see in this "rebellion of common-sense" an indignity offered to the superior knowledge of Economists. The writer is inclined to regard this withdrawal of confidence as a deserved chastisement. The entire attitude of English Political Economy at the present time, whatever may be said for it historically, is out of harmony with usually accepted methods of study. It does not start with analysis, but with assumption, and comes to be for all practical purposes an argument against State intervention. The daily contact of business men with the results of unrestrained competition leads them to deny the rule that economic forces should be subject to no control, and to suspect the system of thought upon which it rests. This is the essence of that which is justifiable in business prejudice against the claims of economists, and discloses an error to be avoided in all branches of political education.

In the entire range of thought outside the applied sciences,

there appears to be but one study the development in which shows the normal relation between theory and practice. This study is Law. The probable explanation of the natural growth here observed is, that Law is born of contested rights. It is largely made through court decisions, and they who make it must themselves apply their own rules. For this reason the imagination, that insidious enemy of all sound thinking (as well as its necessary servant), is kept to its proper functions. Nothing is admitted into a legal system until it has been tested. Nothing is regarded as worthy continued consideration, indeed, unless there come with it adequate means for its realization. Observe, for example, the sharp line drawn by Jurisprudence between moral claims and legal rights. The two may be the same in essence but are separated in Law. A moral claim becomes a legal right when means for its enforcement are provided; and until such machinery may in the existing condition of society be introduced, it lies in the spirit of Law to refuse it recognition. Thus in confining its thought to what is practical, Law binds itself to a growing society, it becomes a developing study, it realizes always the highest which existing conditions render possible, and it excludes confusion by refusing to take cognizance of any but actual cases.

The spirit and method here disclosed ought to be adopted by all who study public questions. The atmosphere surrounding social and industrial problems would then be entirely changed. The suspicion of business men would disappear, because the ground of it would have passed away. Certain it is that from an analysis of this prejudice important lessons may be drawn for those interested in political education.

It remains yet to consider the attitude of the masses toward scholarly statesmanship in a Republic, or—what amounts to the same thing as the theme is here discussed—the possibility of inducing the majority of voters to avail themselves indirectly of the benefits of political educators. The general belief is that the masses are prejudiced against scholarship. It is quite probable that, upon a hasty judgment, this popular sentiment would be regarded as the most serious of all the difficulties to be overcome, but considered by itself as an isolated fact, a careful examination of it fails to support such a conclusion.

There are two subordinate inquiries which must be undertaken in carrying out such an examination: the one asks if the masses of the people are susceptible to the influence of great ideas and high moral principles, and are able to comprehend broad views of public questions; while the second submits the query whether or not the higher education tends to develop aristocratic sentiments. If the first of these questions be answered in the negative or the second in the affirmative, one must despair of influencing public life through a higher political education where popular government prevails.

The first query here submitted, as to the character of influences to which the great numbers of men are open, could be completely answered only by an exhaustive study of the progress of the world's thought. Manifestly such a study is here impossible. If, therefore, the reader will undertake for himself to pass in review the great movements of history, it is believed he must arrive at the conclusion that the masses of men have not been behind their leaders in sensitiveness to great truths or in willingness to undertake their realization. They have too frequently risen in their enthusiasm and action to the level of their foremost statesmen to be open to the charge of confirmed dulness. The record of the ages is a continual interpretation of the words, "Thou did'st hide these things from the wise and understanding, and did'st reveal them unto babes." The things revealed were not theories or syllogisms, but moral perceptions and guiding principles. The question here asked is old, and has appeared under many forms. It is the fundamental one as regards the rationality of self-government, and the extent to which constitutionalism is practised shows at least the present judgment of the world upon it. One might mass quotations confirming it from all grades of literature. "The ruder sort of men," said the late Mr. Bagehot, who perhaps was the keenest observer of character that England has produced in this century, "will sacrifice all they hope, all they have,—*themselves*,—for what is called an idea—for some attraction which seems to transcend reality, which aspires to elevate men by an interest higher, deeper, wider, than that of ordinary men's lives." Said a gentleman who knew thoroughly American politics, "You may talk principles on the stump, but don't try it in the Assembly."

The susceptibility of great bodies of people to ideas that take them outside themselves cannot be reasonably questioned. This, however, proves only the possibility of scholarly control in a popular government, not that it may be easily realized. The masses of men, it is true, may be moved by the same influences that move men of the widest observation and the broadest intellect, yet it does not on that account follow that the many will grant the trained men their confidence. For in addition to the fact that unscholarly dreams may serve the function of great ideas and lead to acts in themselves truly heroic, it must be admitted that the majority of men are influenced as much by the bearing of those who appeal to them as by the matter presented. Popular prejudice against scholarship, so far as it exists, finds its origin just here.

The notion is quite prevalent that education fosters aristocratic sentiments, but aristocracy of any kind is felt to be the enemy of democracy, and in consequence the principle of self-preservation impels the masses of people to look with suspicion upon an uncompromising man of culture.

To the question, Does education foster the aristocratic element in human nature? there is no answer. It may or it may not; all depends upon the spirit in which the instruction is given and received. So far as American colleges are concerned, one must, however, admit that they fail to bring the young men with whom they have to do into harmony with true democracy, which practically effects the same political results as a positive development of an aristocracy of learning. It has become quite fashionable to smile at the Declaration of Independence, because it contains some phrasing that has not stood the test of careful analysis. But such a smile indicates intellectual weakness rather than strength, since it shows that one cares more for words than for the spirit of an age or the truth of an idea so great that it moved a generation. The criticism is a supercilious philological, not a profound historical criticism. Since this shallow sentiment is found most frequently among those who are "superiorly educated," it appears but fair to conclude that the intellectual training at our colleges fails to develop within the student a true understanding of the forces of his own century. Certain it is, so far as success in political life is concerned, that if a scholar's

education has inoculated him with a sense of his personal superiority, he is but poorly equipped to influence men in a country where universal suffrage is the fact. He who does not feel within himself that spirit of humanity which is the essence of democratic sentiment, must be a very clever actor to retain a people's good-will; and the fact that so few have succeeded in this kind of theatricals is to the credit of the electors and a proof of their good sense.

If considerations such as these have any bearing upon the question under discussion, they point to the nature of those influences affecting character that should permeate all instruction in the Political Sciences. It is of even less importance that a student gain technical knowledge than that he should come to understand the permanent forces of his own time and grow into harmony with them. Thus it is the highest task of an instructor to interpret these social forces. All history of the past, all analysis of the present, should be brought to the service of this one purpose. An education under such influences would preserve to the student that healthy optimism always to be found with the main body of the people, and there is no prejudice except in favor of a man who has brought himself into this attitude, or rather who has maintained this attitude notwithstanding his education. The masses of the people are capable of feeling the inspiration of great ideas, and are willing to support men made great by representing them. They make but the one uncompromising demand that these ideas shall be carried out for them by men, the attitude of whose address and the sentiment of whose hearts are not a continuous contradiction to the grandest thought that has ever moved them, which is, that supreme law under nature lies with the people. If the people are to choose their leaders from the educated, that education must have no tendency to develop an aristocracy in feeling, for an aristocracy is the one thing which a democracy (unless so far corrupted as to find pleasure in equality of servitude) will not stand.

The general conclusion to which our study seems to have led is, that the purpose of those who have undertaken this new departure in University education, tho surrounded by many difficulties, may yet be realized. More, however, depends upon

the mental and spiritual attitude of those who undertake the instruction than upon any external conditions whatever. It is the presence or the absence of a rational enthusiasm that will give success or failure to this education. Does a pessimist ask what there is in our day to give birth to scholarly enthusiasm? If a three years' course of study be regarded as not too extended to answer this question for young men, a confirmed pessimist will certainly excuse any failure to answer him in a word. One thing, however, may be said. The permanent lesson of history, to him who finds in its records continuity of purpose, is that different times are entrusted with different problems for solution. The question that to-day presses for recognition is the social question; not in any narrow sense, but bringing with it the widest of moral considerations. Whenever a problem of this nature claims attention, the State must come to the foreground. Herein lies the peculiar appropriateness at the present time of a careful study of questions of public policy and administration, for it is of the utmost importance that the strengthened State should be controlled by men who understand why it is strengthened. He who can grasp this idea holds the mental attitude of a scholar, no matter what his training may have been. Some men are born with this peculiar insight into the present, and possess naturally a judicial temperament; but common minds that have not the genius of statesmanship can only come to this high ground for thought and action by a laborious study of the order of development, and by a purely objective analysis of existing forces and factors. It is then out of a union of pressing necessities on the one hand and great possibilities on the other that there may be born a scholar's enthusiasm. Whether or not schools of Political Science will attain the high success for which they hope, one cannot say; but of this one may be certain: it is essential to the well-being of the immediate future, as well as to the conservation of what is best in democracy, that the purposes which prompted them shall in some manner be worked out.

HENRY C. ADAMS.

THE RAILWAY PROBLEM.

ON the 4th of July, 1828, Charles Carroll, of Carrollton, then the only surviving signer of the Declaration of Independence, turned the first sod in the construction of the Baltimore and Ohio, the earliest of the railways of the United States. If it had been permitted to him to foresee the magnificent results of half a century of national progress, Mr. Carroll could well have said that fate had been kind to him in the imperishable association of his name with that great act which asserted the liberty of these States, and with that other great act which inaugurated the system of internal improvements, to which in great part this country owes its unparalleled progress.

The growth of the railway system and the development of the prosperity of the country have been to each other reciprocally cause and effect. As the railways penetrated the wilderness, agriculture, trade, and commerce followed in their train, and the profits realized therefrom found remunerative investment in new railways, which in their turn widened the boundaries of civilization. The railways have overcome the disintegrating influences of distance and of conflicting sectional interests. They have invited immigration by their development of that great Northwest in which the immigrants have found their homes. They have made the toil of the farmer productive by bringing the markets of the world to his door. They have rendered available the mineral wealth of the country by moving the ore to the mint and the furnace. They have stimulated manufactures by the rapid transportation of the raw material to the factory, and the manufactured product from it. They have built up great cities, in carrying the trade by which those cities live, and the prosperity of the cities has been reflected in the prosperity of tracts of tributary territory. They have made foreign commerce profitable by creating markets for imports and by providing return cargoes in agricultural, mining, and

manufacturing exports. They have added directly to the wealth of the whole country, and of every citizen. While doing this work, they have steadily reduced their transportation rates, until on the rates of 1880, as compared with those of 1866, they have saved to the producer and consumer a sum equivalent to one cent per ton per mile, which, on the freight moved in 1880, amounted to more than three hundred and twenty-three millions of dollars.

A monopoly which can accomplish such results ought certainly be considered a beneficent monopoly. But that aggregation of capital¹ which has constructed and which now operates the railways of the United States is not in any proper sense of the word a monopoly. Not only is that capital managed by independent corporations,² in many cases rivals in business, and in all cases limited in their charges by the inexorable laws of trade; not only are the shares of those corporations for sale in the open market and susceptible of purchase, in large or small quantities, by any one who may desire to participate in their profits or to obtain a voice in their management; not only are the capital and indebtedness of those corporations owned by hundreds of thousands of individual owners—but also under the free railway legislation which now prevails in almost all, if not in all, of the States in the Union, new and competing lines of railway may be constructed by any persons who may form a corporate organization, and who can contribute or borrow the necessary capital. It is obviously a contradiction in terms to characterize such a system as a monopoly, for it lacks that element of absolute and exclusive proprietorship which is the decisive criterion of a monopoly.

The railway business of a continent cannot be conducted without some friction. In the light of the magnitude of the traffic as evidenced by the statistics which are given in the census report for 1880, it is wonderful that complaints are so few and far between.³ The highest eulogium upon the intelligence and

¹ Capital stock paid in, \$2,613,606,264. Funded and floating debt, \$2,812,116,296.

² In 1880 there were 1165 corporations, of which 169 had not yet begun operations.

³ In 1880 the railways transported 244,178,377 local and 25,404,963 through passengers (of whom 143 were killed and 541 injured), and 153,163,276 tons of local and 137,513,999 tons of through freight.

fair dealing which in general characterize the management of the railways of this country is to be found in the small quantity of well-founded popular dissatisfaction with that management. The complaints with which the public ear is most frequently vexed are neither well-founded, intelligent, nor the expression of any real popular grievance, but they are due in some degree to unreasoning ignorance, and in a greater degree to the efforts of demagogues.

The technical skill with which the railways of this country are managed is generally conceded, and criticism is in the main based, not upon the failure to transport freight and passengers with the greatest possible safety and expedition, but upon alleged overcharges, or upon unjust discrimination in charges.

In railway transportation, as in every other business, honesty is the best policy. Intelligent railway managers condemn overcharges and unjust discriminations, for they know that they are as impolitic and as unprofitable to the corporations as they are unlawful. If no higher motives can be supposed to control their action, enlightened selfishness would compel them to deal fairly with all their customers, and to charge such rates as will attract and not repel traffic, thereby developing the business of their roads to their maximum, and earning the largest possible dividends for their shareholders. But until corporations can be managed as well as operated by machinery, their action must be directed by human, and therefore fallible, instrumentalities; and from this it will sometimes result that, in the course of railway operations, individual rights will be wilfully or negligently trespassed upon. What can the State do, what ought the State to do, to prevent such wrongs?

The first condition of the successful solution of the problem is that there should be a clear understanding of its facts.

As the confederation of States has grown into a nation, so the railways, which came into being as separate corporations, created by the authority of independent States and bounded in their action by State lines, have been merged in great railway systems which transport the commerce of the country without trans-shipment or breaking bulk from the Lakes to the Gulf of Mexico, and from the Atlantic to the Pacific. Railways have,

therefore, to do with two chief classes of freight, through and local.¹

As to the through freight, there is competition not only between the different railway systems, but also with the various lines of water transportation, and with the railways of Canada, which import their engines and machinery free of duty, which pay lower wages for their labor, and which are geographically so situated that they can compete on terms favorable to them in the transportation of freight between the Eastern and Western States. As to the local freight also, there is competition, by rail or by water or by both, at many points.

Local freight costs the railways more than through freight. By reason of the fluctuation in its demand upon the terminal facilities, rolling stock, and labor, it involves a large outlay in capital and in cost of administration, with uncertainty as to the amount of return in any given period. It necessitates the frequent transportation of light loads, and a consequent loss of income from unused facilities and unemployed labor. Its necessary sidings, switches, and frogs increase the perils of operation. On the other hand, through freight can be transported in full loaded cars, and with the minimum of labor, by reason of certainty as to the duration of the trip and the demands upon that labor.

All freight is not of equal bulk or value, nor is it necessarily received, carried, or delivered in precisely the same manner. It may be received and delivered at the station and loaded and unloaded by the railway employés; it may be received and delivered at the railway sidings, but loaded and unloaded by the consignor or consignee; it may be received from, and delivered to, sidings on private premises and loaded and unloaded there by the consignor or consignee; or it may be received in one of these ways and delivered in another. So also the stipulated speed of transportation may vary. A railway also has to deal both with retail and wholesale customers, that is, with those who at their option make occasional use of its transportation facilities, and with others who make a prearranged regular and constant use of these facilities.

¹ Of the freight receipts of the railways in 1880, 56.16 per cent was derived from local freight, 42.51 from through freight, and 1.32 per cent from all other freight.

It is to the interest of both the public and the railways that rates should be sufficiently large to yield an adequate return for the capital invested, to maintain the plant in a condition of efficiency, and to permit the railway to avail itself of such improvements as may be, from time to time, made in machinery and appliances. The railway plant includes not merely the road-bed and main tracks, but also the terminal facilities, the way stations, the sidings necessary therefor, the rolling stock, and the skilled labor upon which devolves the maintenance and operation of the road. The traffic must be steady in order that there may be no loss from unused machinery and unemployed labor. Return freights must be provided in order to avoid as far as possible the transportation of empty cars. The cost of moving freight varies upon different lines, and upon different parts of the same line, in accordance with the grades, the more or less expensive character of the tunnels, bridges, viaducts, and other engineering appliances that have been provided to overcome natural obstacles, and the cost to the railway of its machinery, fuel, and labor.

The railway manager has, therefore, in fixing a rate to determine the cost of moving a given quantity of freight of the particular kind over the designated distance in the desired manner; and to that end he must consider several elements, to each of which due weight must be given: First, the extent to which the company's way or terminal facilities and labor will be used in handling the freight; second, the necessary demand of that freight upon motive-power and rolling stock, and the possibility of obtaining a full return freight; third, the length of the haul and the favorable or unfavorable character of the grades; fourth, the degree of expedition required, and the consequent accommodation to, or disturbance of, the general traffic arrangements of the road; fifth, the constant or fluctuating character of the demands of the particular freight upon the road's facilities; and, sixth, the relative bulk and value of the freight and the degree of the carrier's responsibility for its safe transportation. Railways have not been chartered, nor has capital been invested in their construction, upon the theory that they are to do business at, or for less than, cost. The railway manager must therefore, in order that dividends may be earned, add, after determining

the cost of moving and handling the particular freight, such a sum for profit as will, in addition to the company's profits from other sources, furnish an adequate return for the capital invested.

But railways cannot always, nor indeed often, arbitrarily determine their rates. Those rates, as applied to articles of commerce or of domestic trade, are necessarily controlled by the market values of those articles at the point of consumption, for those rates must be so proportioned to those values that the articles can be sold at a profit. In general, also, the price of transportation, like that of all other services and all commodities, is dependent upon the existence of a demand, and the relation between that demand and its supply. Railway rates are, therefore, limited in the first place by that enlightened selfishness which induces the carrier to create and foster the demand, and in the second place by that adequacy or excess of supply in relation to demand, which is, in one word, competition. Even where no actual competition exists, rates are affected by its possible creation, for where there is a volume of business which demands transportation and which is charged an unfairly high rate, the surplus capital of the country will promptly seek profitable investment in the construction of a railway to supply that existing demand. Yet an excess of competition in transportation brings in its train serious evils from which the country has more than once suffered. A war of railway rates causes to the shareholders in the companies a diminution of dividends, and sometimes a loss of the principal of their investments, and to the community a fluctuation in values of merchandise, which tends to obliterate the distinction between speculation and legitimate business, and which is always followed by individual losses. Such a war may result also in the bankruptcy of weaker companies, in their absorption by their stronger rivals, and in the consequent loss to the public of the benefits derivable from healthy competition. To guard against the evils of such wars the railways have resorted to pooling agreements whereby at competitive points the traffic or its receipts is divided in stipulated proportions between the competing roads, yet such agreements, like treaties between sovereign States, are broken when either party to them fancies that its interests will be subserved by

their abrogation. The facts that the power of fixing rates over connecting lines through to the point of destination is necessarily vested in the company which receives the goods from the shipper, and that that power in the exigencies of competition is inevitably delegated to irresponsible subordinates to whom their road's need of business is all-important, render nugatory in the hour of trial all pooling agreements, however carefully negotiated and solemnly ratified.

The problem is, therefore, complicated by the competition of water transportation and of railways whose lines are not within the United States, by the opposing interests of rival States and cities, by the necessity of fostering competition and yet restraining it within due bounds, by the independent and possibly conflicting jurisdiction of the United States and of the several States, and by the impotency of governmental action, either legislative or executive, to arbitrarily determine prices, or to interpose barriers to the course of trade.

No new legislation is needed to define the relative rights and duties of railways and their customers.

There is no uncertainty as to the existing law with regard to railway rates. A railway company is bound by its charter. It may lawfully charge such rates as that charter authorizes, and when the charter is silent, or when it vests in the company the power of fixing rates, the company, like all other common carriers, is bound to carry all freight that may be offered to the extent of its facilities at reasonable rates and without unjust discrimination, and it is legally compellable to refund any overcharge in excess of that which shall be adjudged to be reasonable.

If transportation rates could be treated, without reference to the public interest, as subjects of private bargain between the railway and its customers, it would be lawful for the railway on the one hand to demand whatever sum, however exorbitant, that the necessities of its customer would compel him to pay, and for the customer, on the other hand, to have his goods carried as nearly free as possible. But that duty to the public which requires the railway to carry all freight at a reasonable rate defines as reasonable that rate which not only adequately remunerates the railway for the transportation of the particular freight, but also enables it to carry that freight without preju-

dice to its performance of its duty of transporting other classes of freight. In other words, neither the customer nor the railway can be permitted to ignore the fact that the railway is not a private but a common carrier, and that, therefore, its charges must be fixed with reference to its performance of duties to others as well as to the particular customer.

The prohibition of unjust discrimination means simply that a common carrier must charge like rates for like services. It does not mean that the carrier must disregard the well-settled distinction between retail and wholesale business, and must charge the same rate per ton to the man who when and as he pleases ships one ton of coal and to the man who in compliance with contract ships one million tons; nor does it forbid the carrier to make such a discrimination by refunding a rebate after the freight shall have been paid upon the wholesale quantity at retail rates, for the object of the system of rebates is only to protect the carrier against a possible breach of the freighter's contract to deliver the stipulated quantity. Nor does it mean that the carrier shall not in its rates distinguish between those who use its transportation and terminal facilities and labor, and those who use only one or more of those services. Nor does it mean that the carrier may not charge more for transportation over a mile of mountain grades, or a mile of bridge, or through a mile of tunnel, than over a mile of open road in a flat country. Nor does it mean that the carrier may not charge more for expedition of transportation. Nor does it mean that the rates must vary in the ratio of the distances, that is, that the carrier must charge as the rate upon a given quantity of freight for forty miles double the sum which it would charge for twenty miles. Such a rule would disregard the facts that the terminal charges which are generally the same in each of the supposed cases, are a substantial element in the determination of the rate, and that the variance in grade and in necessary expenditure in construction may be such as to render the cost of transportation for forty miles but little greater than that for twenty of those forty miles. Such a rule would also ignore those interests of the public which must not be lost sight of in the consideration of the demands of private customers of the railways. It may be to the interest of the owner of a coal mine fifty miles from market

that rates should be so arranged that another mine owner fifty miles farther away must be shut out of the market, but it is not to the interest of the public that competition should be prevented, and that the cry of anti-monopoly should thus be made effective in the legal establishment and preservation of the worst sort of monopolies. If such a rule had prevailed in the past, the condition of the country to-day would not present the favorable contrast that it now does to the condition of fifty years ago. It is that inequality of rates of transportation in proportion to distance which has built up the trade of the great cities by extending the territory from which the markets of those cities draw their supplies, and it is that same inequality which has developed the manifold manufacturing industries of this country.

Yet even those who admit that the legal relation of the railways and their customers is sufficiently defined by existing law contend that the law is not in practice powerful enough nor prompt enough to do justice as between the railways and the citizens. If this grave aspersion upon the administration of justice were well founded, it might be answered that the appropriate remedy is to be found not in special legislation with regard to railway litigation, but in the accomplishment of such a substantial law reform as will give us only pure and able judges and honest and intelligent jurors. But in fact the aspersion is not well founded. No dispassionate observer of the proceedings in our courts, no careful student of our law reports, will find that as between corporations and individuals there exists any tendency in favor of the former and against the latter to mitigate the severity of the written law. On the contrary, substantial justice is, in general, done in our courts; but when incompetent judges and ignorant jurors err, their mistakes always operate for communism and equally against corporations and those individuals whose wealth, whether inherited or earned, has raised them above the common mass.

It has been contended that the remedy for railway abuses is to be found in governmental acquisition of railway property. No mode of acquisition can, of course, be contemplated other than a purchase as the result either of a voluntary agreement of sale, or of a compulsory taking under the power of eminent

domain, which necessarily involves compensation to the owners of the property so taken, for acquisition by any other mode is confiscation. Assuming, for the sake of the argument, the constitutional power of the government to buy and operate the railways, the main objections to any such purchase are these: first, the outlay for the purchase and maintenance of existing railways and for the construction of such other railways as will be needed in the near future will exceed the cost of the suppression of the Rebellion¹ and in comparison with the amount of the subsequent annual appropriations for railways, the appropriations for pension bills, and River and Harbor bills, will be trifling and insignificant; second, it is certain that the government does not and cannot do its work as economically as corporations and individuals, and so far therefore from governmental acquisition of the railways resulting in the lowering of rates there would be in all probability a raising of rates: third, the favorable influence of competition in the reduction of rates will at once be lost; fourth, State railways in this country would be centres of corruption: the unsavory history of the Erie Canals in New York, and the Pennsylvania State Line of Public Improvements, furnish useful lessons on this subject; fifth, with our unreformed civil service, a political party once intrenched in the railways, would never be driven from power;² sixth, it is not to the interest of those who do business with railways that their claims for damages should only be audited and paid through the Court of Claims and Congressional appropriations;³ seventh, the State ownership of railways means the withdrawal from the States and from the municipalities of a subject of taxation which now pays a not insignificant share of their expenditures;⁴ eighth, the conflicting interests of rival cities and States would intensify political animosities and bring the government into discredit.

It is therefore preferable that the ownership of railway prop-

¹ The reported cost of the 87,891.35 miles constructed up to 1880 is \$4,883,740,-596, including equipment and supplies on hand.

² In 1880 the railway employ  s of all grades numbered 418,957, and their annual pay-roll was \$195,350,013.

³ In 1880 the total damages paid amounted to \$3,456,265.

⁴ In 1880 the railways paid taxes to the amount of \$13,283,819.

erty should remain in the future, as it is now, in individuals acting in corporate organizations.

It is also contended that the State may by legislation regulate the tariff of railway rates, and summarily redress railway abuses. In a republic governmental action is necessarily circumscribed by constitutional limitations. Much misapprehension with regard to the power of the State over the railways has resulted from reasoning by analogy, for the logical value of that method of reasoning is dependent upon an exact similarity in all points between the subjects of comparison. It is a truism that railways are public highways, and yet it is clear that they are not highways in the sense that navigable rivers, canals, and roads, whether common or improved, are highways. Railways differ from those other highways in an important respect which deprives the analogy of all value, and that is, that the railway is not only an artificial highway, but also that it can only be used as a highway in connection with artificial means of transportation which the railway must itself supply and operate. The earlier railways in England and in this country were chartered upon the theory that the company would provide the road and the customers find their several modes of transportation; but it was soon discovered that the magnitude, complexity, and dangers of the business were too great to admit of its conduct in that manner.¹

It is, of course, the duty of the State to provide highways for the use of its citizens. That duty may be performed, either by the construction of such highways by public officers expending the public funds, or by persons, natural or corporate, expending their own funds and receiving compensation therefor either in the direct payment of money by the State, or in the grant of a franchise. Under the power of eminent domain the State may lawfully take, for the purpose of such construction, the private property of any citizen, upon making due compensation therefor, and the property so taken will be vested in the State's grantee, the corporation, subject only to such limitations upon its use and enjoyment as may be imposed by the terms of the charter. That charter constitutes a contract between the State and the

¹ In 1880 the equipment included 17,412 locomotives, 12,330 passenger, 4475 mail, express, and baggage, and 455,450 freight and other cars.

corporation, as binding upon the one as the other. If that charter contain no reservation to the State of a power to impair or destroy the franchise granted, that franchise is indefeasible. Neither principles of right nor rules of law are violated, when the State contracts with a corporation to construct and maintain an improved highway, and stipulates that for the construction and maintenance of that highway the corporation shall be reimbursed by the collection of a transportation charge from those whose persons or whose goods are carried over it.

If the State, by subsequent legislation, so limits the charge as to diminish the compensation stipulated to be paid to the corporation for its performance of the State's duty of constructing and maintaining the highway, the State thereby confiscates the property of those citizens who are the shareholders in the corporation. It is no answer to this to say, that, altho investments in the bonds and shares of railways are private property, yet the franchise is a public use, and as such necessarily subject to governmental regulation. The reply is as conclusive as it is obvious. The State cannot, either in morals or in law, so regulate the use of the highway as to diminish the price it had agreed to pay for the construction and maintenance of that highway; any more than the State can deprive the builder of a jail of a portion of the contract price stipulated to be paid for its construction, or can repudiate its bonded debt.

Corporate property is subject to the taxing power of the State, but it is protected against any undue exercise of that power by those constitutional limitations which are only expressive of the eternal principles of justice, when they require taxes to be uniform. Corporate property is also, in common with all other private property, subject to police regulation, which means simply that the State may by just and equal regulation prevent any one from so using and enjoying his own property as to impair the enjoyment by others of their property. In these and in all other respects corporate property is protected from confiscation to the same extent, and by the same means, that the property of every individual is protected. The homestead and the farm of the farmer, the warehouse and goods of the merchant, the mill and machinery of the manufacturer, and the home of every man, have no protection other than or

greater than that which the constitution and the laws of this free country throw around investments in the bonds and shares of corporations. If that principle of communism which underlies the anti-monopoly agitation is to become a potential force in this country, it will not rest satisfied with the confiscation of railway property, but it will with equal vigor and success attack all private property. It is clear that any one State cannot regulate traffic beyond its own boundaries, nor within those boundaries so as to prohibit or embarrass inter-State commerce. So also the Federal Government cannot regulate the internal trade of any State, yet having regard to the national character of the railway system and to conflicting sectional interests, it is obviously to the interest of the whole country that any regulation of traffic should be administered under Federal, rather than State authority. But governmental action is circumscribed by other than constitutional limitations. Legislation cannot control the operation of the laws of nature or the laws of trade. No legislation can enable railways to transport goods as cheaply across rivers, or over or under mountains, as through level plains, or compel railways to charge rates upon local traffic so low as to force their relinquishment of through traffic. Any such legislation will be as ineffective as the Acts of Parliament which fixed the price of bread, or the Act of Congress which defined the price of gold. The history of tariff legislation, with its inconsistencies, its arbitrary changes, and its subserviency to sectional rather than national interests, is not such as to induce the most thoroughgoing protectionist to advocate the direct regulation of railway rates by Act of Congress. Indeed, if Congress were to take upon itself that duty, it must sit *en permanence*, and it would have no leisure for other legislation.

No Act of Congress could lay down rates which shall be equitably just for all articles, under all conditions of transportation, and for all time. If the rates were not remunerative they would lead to the bankruptcy of the railways, upon which would follow commercial ruin and distress. If the rates are adequate now, they will be too high in the future.¹ If a commission were to be constituted to fix rates for the whole country

¹ The history of the Pennsylvania Railroad illustrates this. Under an act of 1861 it is authorized to charge certain rates, which were then regarded as unduly restrictive, but which are largely in excess of the rates it now charges.

that commission would wield an arbitrary and despotic power, in comparison with which the Government of Russia is liberal constitutionalism. Such a commission would make and unmake fortunes, build up or destroy great cities, and move the seat of empire at its pleasure.

Wise legislation should regard not only the present condition of the country, but also its probable future development. The area of the United States is 3,034,399 square miles, of which 2,970,000 square miles are land, one half of which is arable, and less than one twelfth of the whole land has been as yet put under cultivation. Europe, which has but one half the area of the United States, has a population of one hundred and forty-five to the square mile. The United States has a population of sixteen and one half to the square mile. In view of the probable increase of population by immigration and by natural growth, the consequent extension of the area of cultivated land, the development of villages into cities and of territories into States, and the establishment of new seats of manufactures and new centres of trade, is it not reasonable to suppose that in order to supply the increased demand for transportation, many new lines of railway must be constructed in the near future? It is not the nature of capital to seek unprofitable investments, and it is only wise to so legislate with regard to railways that capital shall be invited and not discouraged.

Having regard to the complexity of the problem, to the magnitude of the pecuniary amounts involved, to the diverse interests of rival States and cities, to possible conflicts between State and Federal jurisdictions, to the inadequacy of legislation to cope with the laws of trade, and to the conditions of the present and the needs of the future, is it not more in keeping with the republican theory of government, and more statesman-like, to trust for the prevention of railway abuses to the application of ordinary legal remedies, to the influence of healthy competition under the laws of trade, and to the enlightened selfishness of railway managers, rather than to attempt to devise extraordinary means of prevention, which, if efficacious, may produce abuses more serious and wide-reaching in their effects than those which they are intended to remedy?

CHRISTOPHER STUART PATTERSON.

A STUDY OF THE MIND'S CHAMBERS OF IMAGERY.

EVERY man, woman, and child has such a chamber where he or she has laid up a store of images or photographs of the objects which have been perceived. It may be interesting to take a look into it and inspect its contents, which will be found to be very curious. Every man has his own chamber of imagery with its separate furniture, grave or gay. It is the place of figures and fancies.

I.

I call the power which reproduces in old or in new forms our past experiences the *Phantasy*, a phrase employed by Aristotle to denote one of the faculties of the mind, and which was used in the English tongue down to the beginning of the last century, when it was abbreviated into *Fancy*, with a more confined meaning. The product may be called the *Phantasm*—always to be distinguished from the *phantom*, in which the object is imaginary. *Phantasy* is a good phrase to designate the remembrance or imaging of a single object, say a lily, as distinguished from a general idea, such as the class lily. The faculty may also be called the *Imaging* or *Pictorial* power, only there is no image or picture except when the reproduction is of an object perceived by the sense of sight—the other senses, however, being also capable of reviving what has passed before us. It is the mind's eye of Shakespeare: "In my mind's eye, Horatio."

All these phrases are figurative, always implying and pointing to a reality. We talk of an image, a likeness, a representation, an idea. In what sense? So far as the sense of sight is concerned, there is an image on the retina of the eye. But this is so situated that it is not seen naturally; in fact, it has been discovered by science. The object is perceived upright, but it is inverted in the eye. Then, so far as the other senses are con-

cerned, there is no image properly speaking. There is merely an affection of the organ—of the ear, the touch, the palate, the nostrils. Speaking rigidly, there is no image of a taste or a sound. Even so far as vision is concerned, the image on the retina cannot be said to be perceived by the mind. It is merely an affection of the organism of such a kind that it becomes the fitting means by which the exact form and color of the object is known; just—and not otherwise—as an ear makes known the sounds emitted. In respect of an image, there can be no such thing in the brain in regard to any of the senses. In all the senses there is an affection not only of the physical part of the senses proper, but of the brain; but this does not take the shape of a form of any kind. If there is no figure in the brain, still less can there be in the mind. A figure is an extended material thing. The figure of a tree is no more in the mind than the tree is. In all the senses the perception is simply a knowledge of an object under a certain aspect, say as having a form or odor. In this sense only is an idea the representation of an object. There is really no likeness between gold as out of the mind and the idea of gold in the mind. There is a correspondence between the two, but no identity.

In fact, this imaging power is merely one of the factors in the memory. In memory there is a recognition of an object or event as having been before us in time past. But in the mere imaging there is no such recognition and no reference to time. We may have a phantasm of a flower without any belief as to where or when we saw it, or indeed as to whether we ever saw it. But in all proper memory there is an image or phantasm, dull or vivid, representing the object or event recognized.

It has to be added, that the mind has the power of forming imaginary figures. These are compositions constructed by the mind out of realities experienced. We have now, not memory, but imagination. Our imaginations, as every one knows, are often more lively than our recollections. The mind delights to form such pictures, and it is the office of the poet and novelist to raise them up by the presentations they furnish.

First. We can thus reproduce the material got by any of the senses. We remember tastes of salt, of sugar, of jelly, of apples, of oranges, and hundreds of other things that are sour

or sweet, or do otherwise powerfully affect our palate pleasantly or unpleasantly. These recollections are not especially inspiring or poetical, but are cherished by gourmands, who feel as it were the taste in their mouth of the food they relish. We can recall the sensation produced by odors, say from roses, lilies, and violets, or from assafœtida, swamps, and malarial pools. Some of these are of an ethereal nature, and have a place allowed them in poetry. We can call up a thousand kinds of sounds, as the voices of our friends, the sighings of the breeze or stream, the barking of the dog, the mewing of the cat, the bellowing of the bull, the lowing of cattle, the chirp or the song of birds—say of the thrush or nightingale, the screech of the eagle, the rasping of the file, the mower whetting his scythe, the roar of the storm, the lashing of the wave on the shore, the rolling of the thunder, the crash of the avalanche. People endowed with a musical ear can recall tunes and are prompted to repeat them, and some are constantly hearing musical airs.

“ Music, when soft voices die,
Vibrate in the memory;
Odors, when sweet violets sicken,
Live within the sense they quicken.”

There are touches which we easily remember—of softness or smoothness, say of satin or of a smooth skin, or of the prickliness of a briar or thorn. The child retains forever the memory of a mother's kiss. But we get our most vivid and varied memories from the sense of sight. We delight to remember colors, say of a flower or a piece of dress, of the morning and evening sky. We image certain forms, as of the persons and faces of our friends, of noble trees, of well-proportioned buildings, of mountains. All that is picturesque, that is picture-like, that is with a well-defined shape, as steeples, cliffs, precipices, leave a photograph of themselves on our souls. The artist uses many of these in his paintings, in his portraits, and in his landscapes. The poet turns them to all sorts of uses in pleasing, in exciting and elevating the mind.

This imaging power helps greatly to enliven our existence. We call up an incident of our childhood. We remember the day on which we were first sent to school, and how we set out

from our parents' roof with strangely mingled feelings of confidence and timidity. As we bring back the scene, mark how everything appears with a pictorial power. We have a vivid picture, it may be, of the road we travelled; we see, as it were, the school-house within and without; we hear, as it were, the master addressing us, and the remarks which the children passed upon us. Or, more pleasant still, we remember a holiday trip in the company of pleasant companions or kind relatives to a place interesting in itself or by its associations; or the visit we paid to the house of a kind friend who had a thousand contrivances to please and entertain us. How vivid at this moment the picture before us of the incidents of the journey, of the little misfortunes that befell us, of the amusements provided for us, of the persons, the countenances, the smiles, the voice and words of those who joined us in our mirth or ministered to our gratification. We not only recollect the events: we, as it were, perceive them before us; the imaging is an essential element of our remembrance. Wordsworth is painting from the life when he speaks of

“ Those recollected hours that have the charm
Of visionary things; those lovely forms
And sweet sensations that throw back our life,
And almost make remotest infancy
A visible scene on which the sun is shining.”

Or possibly there may be scenes which have imprinted themselves more deeply upon our minds—which have, as it were, burned their image into our souls. Let us throw back our mind upon the time when death first intruded into our dwelling. We remember ourselves standing by the dying bed of a father, and then we recall how a few days after we saw the corpse put into the coffin and then borne away to the grave. How terribly distinct and startling do these scenes stand before us at this instant! We see that pallid countenance looking forth from the couch upon us; we hear that voice becoming feebler and still feebler; and then we feel as if we were looking at that fixed form which the countenance took when the spirit had fled; we follow the long funeral as it winds away to the place of the dead, and we hear the earth falling on the coffin as the dust is committed to its kindred dust.

Secondly. It should be specially noticed that not only are we able to represent these sensible scenes, we are further *able to picture the thoughts and feelings which passed through our minds as we mingled in them.* Not only do we remember the road along which we travelled and the building which we entered: we can bring up the feelings with which we set out from our parents' house, and those with which we passed into the school. Not only do we recollect the amusements which so interested us, but the feelings of interest with which we engaged in them. Not only do we picture the chamber in which a father breathed his last: we can call up the mingled emotions of anxiety or hope and fear with which we watched by his dying bed, and the grief which overwhelmed us as we realized the loss we had suffered. We bring up the feelings which chased each other as we sat by his corpse, or when we returned to our home and felt all to be so blank and melancholy.

We can thus live our mental experiences over again: the efforts we make to acquire a branch of knowledge, a new language, or a new science, and how we found the process to be irksome or stimulating; what we felt in our failures or our successes, in our fights and in our triumphs, in our friendships and in our enmities, in our temptations yielded to and our temptations resisted. As we survey the past, we can remember the gratitude we felt on kindness shown us, the sorrow that overwhelmed us on the death of a friend, the bitterness of the disappointment when our best hopes were frustrated, when one we trusted betrayed us, the pang that shot through us when we found that we had committed an unworthy deed. We are obliged to use metaphorical language in describing these recollections. We speak of our being able to image or picture to ourselves the outward incidents and the inward feelings, and we thus set forth an important truth.

True, we cannot give these mental states a sensible figure. The reason is obvious. They had no visible or tangible form when we first experienced them, and the memory, in reproducing them, will represent them as they first presented themselves. This circumstance, I may add in passing, furnishes an argument of some little force in favor of the immateriality of the soul. In our primary knowledge and in our subsequent recollection of

bodies we have a sensible image. But in our consciousness of our mental states and in our recalling them we do not, and indeed cannot, so represent them. We give a bodily shape to the school at which we learned our tasks, to the persons and countenances of our early associates, but we cannot give a form or local habitation to our remembered cogitations and sentiments, which live in a higher sphere.

It is conceivable that the memory might have been as correct as it is as to matters of fact without having any pictorial power. In fact, the majority of our memories must be of this character. It is well it should be so, for otherwise excitement would waste our life, and keep us from the performance of many commonplace but important duties. But that is a most benignant endowment whereby we can image absent objects and past events, lay them up in "chambers of imagery," and make them pass as in a panorama before us. We can thus have a series of paintings of all the scenes in which we have mingled, a set of portraits of the friends with whom we had sweet intercourse, and we can view them as Cowper did his mother's portrait :

"Faithful remembrancer of one so dear;
And while that face renews my filial grief
Fancy shall weave a charm for my relief,
Shall steep me in Elysian reverie.
A momentary dream that thou art she,
By contemplation's help not sought in vain,
I seem to have lived my childhood o'er again—
To have renewed the joys that once were mine,
Without the sin of violating thine.
And while the wings of fancy still are free,
And I can view this mimic show of thee,
Time has but half succeeded in his theft—
Thyself removed, thy power to soothe me left."

This imaging power, as it tends to enliven the mind, so it also tends to give vividness to its productions in words and writings. He is an interesting companion who, having laid up a store of pictures, is ever bringing them out in his conversation. Travelers and biographers instruct us best when they are able to give us a word-painting of the scene and of the man or woman. History is vastly more attractive when it gives the event with its concomitants—say the battle with the field on which it was

fought. Our pictorial writers are generally the most popular. In the mediæval ages they illuminated the manuscripts to attract and delight the eye. In our day, books in almost every department of literature are illustrated. This power has a still more important function. Nothing tends more to degrade the mind and sink it in the mire than low and sensual images rolled as a sweet morsel under the tongue. On the other hand, images of duty, of self-sacrifice, of courage, of honor, of beauty, of love, elevate and ennoble the soul.

Some of the phantasms are much more vivid than others. They differ also in the case of different individuals, and of the same individual at different times or in different states of his body. It is a curious question what can be the cause of this difference. Without professing to exhaust the subject we may specify some circumstances which undoubtedly have an influence on the vividness of the picture.

1. There is the original vividness of the sensation depending primarily on the sensitiveness of the organ, but under this also upon the nature of the object perceived. The senses evidently differ in this respect. The most lively is the sense of sight. The forms and colors originally made known by it may come up almost with the distinctness of the realities. The mental representation (we can scarcely call it picture) of sounds is often very intense, especially in the case of those who have a musical ear, but also when the impression on the ear is strong or vehement—made, for instance, by the bursting of a cannon. Tastes and odors may also be recalled with less impressiveness, as also touches and feelings in our nerves. There are times when our sensations of shapes, colors, and sounds are very intense, and in these cases they are apt to be reproduced with greater vividness. There are scenes of gorgeous coloring, there are picturesque figures, such as horrid precipices; there are sounds such as those of a falling rock, of thunder, or of an avalanche, which we can never forget. Some persons are evidently more susceptible of intense impressions than others, and in these cases the images are apt to be more vivid, and these may be embodied in paintings, in statues, or in word-painting in prose or poetry.

2. The formation of the image is dependent on the state of

the brain. It is believed that even in our sense-perceptions there is brain action. It seems to be established that the third convolution of the left side of the cerebrum is the organ of the symbolic power, or of language. Some eminent men, such as Hitzig, and Fritsch, and Ferrier, maintain that each sense has a separate location in the brain; others deny this. Without entering into this discussion, it is allowed that brain action is necessary to sense action. The whole eye might be perfect and yet there is no vision if there be a lesion in certain parts of the brain. Not only so, but brain action is required in order to the reproduction of our sense-perceptions. Now it is highly probable that the same part of the brain acting in the perception is necessary in order to its reproduction. When there is a lesion of a certain part of the brain it may not be possible to form an image of the object. In all cases the vividness of the image may depend on the health and susceptibility of the brain matter.

It is well known that persons may lose certain of their recollections while they retain others. The defect seems to arise from a lesion of the brain. We have the record of persons losing the power of picturing forms, while their memory was good in all other respects. We have more frequent instances of people losing their power of using languages or particular languages. This is the disease of aphasia, arising from a derangement in the organ of language. There are cases of persons losing a portion of their knowledge for a time and then recovering it; perhaps losing it suddenly, and recovering it as suddenly. In all such cases it looks as if, in acquiring the original knowledge, there is a certain state of the brain produced, say by a certain disposition of the molecules, probably in the gray matter in the periphery of the brain. Where there is an effacement or derangement of this matter in the brain the knowledge cannot be recalled. Sometimes the disorganization is only for a time, and when it is cured the mental power is ready to act.

3. There is the mental force particularly of the attention directed to the scenes as they first passed before us. We were interested in them, we turned them round and round, we viewed them under various aspects, and having been so encouraged and fondled, they are apt to visit us again and again, and put on their

best expression. The painter has to study the features of landscapes and the countenances and attitudes of men and women to give us correct figures on his canvas. Under this view, the capacity of bringing up images is more within our power than we might at first imagine.

JAMES MCCOSH.


II.

Dr. McCosh, in the first part of this article, has described the general laws and characteristics of our mental imagery. There follows in the second part an account of some of the results obtained from a special inquiry into this subject, by means of printed questions circulated among a large number of college students.

This inquiry began in 1881 with the distribution at Princeton and Vassar Colleges of Mr. Francis Galton's *Questions upon the Visualising and Allied Faculties*. The replies—about sixty in number—were forwarded to Mr. Galton, who made some use of them in his recently published "Inquiries into the Human Faculty." This work embraces the very original psychological studies of a number of years, and will have a wide influence in popularizing this branch of research; among a great variety of subjects it brings out with force the well-known theories of the author in regard to the obscure influences of heredity and environment, or nature and nurture, upon our ordinary mental operations. Dr. McCosh and myself took up the subject in its more purely psychological bearings, and in pursuing the investigation we have adopted Mr. Galton's method. His Questions, full as they were, naturally did not exhaust such an extensive subject, and a careful reading of the first set of replies suggested several lines of inquiry which might be more fully followed out. The plan took shape in our issuing a second series of questions, which covered some of the problems already discussed by Mr. Galton, and in addition entered some branches of the subject which before had remained untouched. Copies were distributed at Princeton, and a number also were sent to the Harvard Medical School, through the kindness of Professor Stanley Hall.

As it relies wholly upon self-analysis, this method of research is open to the twofold objection that many persons have distorted

ideas of the working of their own minds, and replies may be governed by preconceived notions derived from various sources. It must be confessed we looked somewhat suspiciously upon the first batch of answers, for there seemed to be too much of the personal equation about them, tho signs of the real trustworthiness of the method soon came to the surface; sets of replies from widely scattered sources corroborated each other and fell into natural groups. One such instance may be cited: it was found in a *number-form*¹ which a Vassar student handed in. Never having seen those of other persons, her representation was independent of any previous knowledge of the subject, yet it bore a strong likeness to several which Mr. Galton had obtained in England. Again, a young physician who had never given the subject any attention before, described to us one evening an oval image, in which the twelve months of the year invariably arranged themselves before his mind's eye; the accompanying drawing gives a rough idea of it.



This image coincides with Mr. Galton's description of several which he collected in England. These are two illustrations among hundreds which might be quoted if this method were in need of vindication. Individual eccentricities are often discredited until the circle of inquiry is widened and one apparently anomalous case is matched and authenticated by a similar one from another source. Individual errors of self-inspection are lost in the general results. It must be kept in mind, however, that those who do not possess a vivid imagery are far less

¹ The term *number-form* has been applied by Mr. Galton to vague images which arise in some minds in connection with the arrangement of numerals.

likely to reply than those who do, so that if the replies are collected at random the averages are apt to be too high.

We give below an abstract from the series of thirteen questions which we distributed; among these, numbers 5, 6, and 12 were taken with some slight change from Mr. Galton's series; the remainder were original. Beneath the questions is printed a portion of one of the sets of replies which we received.

The object of these Questions is to ascertain the degree in which the power of forming images in the mind's eye exists in different individuals, and at various ages in the same individual; also how it is influenced by intellectual pursuits and tastes and by the states of mind and body both at the time the images are formed and when they are reproduced.

QUESTIONS.

4. Estimate the relative vividness of your remembrances of (a) Form, (b) Color, (c) Odors, (d) Touches, (e) Sounds.

5. *Persons*.—Can you recall with equal ease the faces of near relatives, friends, or people you have seen but once? Can you cause the image of a well-known person to sit, stand, or go through unusual motions such as in Calisthenics? Where a face is with difficulty recalled what mental method do you adopt to facilitate the process?

6. *Comparison with reality*.—Have you ever mistaken a mental image for reality when in health and wide awake? How frequently do mental images arise in your mind without an effort of the will?

9. *Emotions*.—Can you recall emotions or states of mind and feeling as clearly as images of external objects? Which do you recall most vividly—(a) natural scenes, (b) persons, (c) states of mind during prominent events in your history?

10. *Physical state*.—(a) Are the most vivid mental images that you can now bring up associated with any definite physical state at the time you formed them, such as active exercise on horseback or in running, or such as comparative repose in reading or study? (b) Do you seem to be able to call up mental images easier at one time of the day than another, or in an active rather than a quiet state of body? (c) If you have ever experienced any impairment of vision how has this affected your visualising power at the time or subsequently?

11. *State of mind*.—What was the state of mind in which the most vivid mental images you can now recall, were formed? In what states of mind can you recall mental images most readily?

12. *Childhood and age*.—Have your powers of visualising varied much in your recollection? At what age were the earliest mental images formed which you can still recall. State if you can what is the character of those images—do they seem as bright as those formed in later years? What

events of your home life in childhood do you recall most readily or vividly?

13. Have you come suddenly upon an entirely new scene, and while certain of its novelty felt inwardly that you had seen it before—with a conviction that you were revisiting a dimly familiar locality? Mention if you can an instance or two in which this has occurred. Has any satisfactory explanation of this experience ever suggested itself to you?

REPLIES.

4. Form is vivid. I can see the shape of almost every article of furniture. Color is not very distinct. Odors are only distinct when physical state calls them up, as odor of food when hungry. Touches are merely clear, while sounds are often very vivid. Certain sounds make me shiver to think of them, so vivid are they.

5. I have no image of my nearest friends, but can call up the face of some person I have met lately. But I cannot do this more than two or three times when the face is lost to my vision. I can place figures of persons in certain positions; for instance, I can see my father, excepting his face, in his pulpit. The way I call up what faces I can is by thinking and imaging their surroundings or dress.

6. I never mistook a mental vision for reality. Mental images, since I have been in college, have been almost wholly by will, but formerly they came more readily.

9. I do, and even more vividly. I feel over my sorrows, etc., often most keenly. I recall natural scenery more vividly than faces, but mental states most vividly—often in feeling over mental states, involuntarily acting, tho I cannot say that I ever mistake them for reality.

10. Mental images, so far as I have been able to observe, come most in a passive state of body, and are not associated with any particular exercise.

11. When I am engaged in any kind of mental labor my visions do not come. When I am in a comparatively pensive state with no particular mental object in view, I am most apt to have images.

12. My visualising power I feel is not so good as it was a few years ago. I do not remember when I did not have mental images. I recall very vividly my sister falling into the water and how she looked when she was rescued, tho I was not over four or five years old at the time.

13. I always form a mental image of a place to which I am going for the first time. Sometimes the actual scene conforms with my image, but by a little effort of memory I am usually able to trace the connection.

These answers are somewhat above the average, but upon the whole the replies were intelligently written, and afforded a large quantity of fresh material.

Figuratively speaking, the machinery of our visual memory works unevenly, well oiled here and rusty there; talent for imag-

ing one class of objects may be offset by a marked unskilfulness in imaging another. As Mr. Galton has observed, no one could have foreseen the extent of individual variation which this investigation has disclosed. We wish here to lay the emphasis not upon our imagery of classes of objects, for that largely hinges upon individual taste and education, but upon the caprice of our imagery among objects of the same class. Take faces, concerning which our information is amplest: prominent as they are in our chambers of imagery, no one seems to have an even gift of recalling them, as shown in a number of answers to *Question 5*, selected at random.

(1) I can recall the features of some exceedingly well-known persons, as of my own family; (2) It is hard for me to image faces with great distinctness of detail; (3) I can recall comparative strangers with more ease than near relatives; (4) I can recall the features of many persons, of almost any one, better than of my friends and relatives; (5) I can recall the features of all whom I have ever known intimately, except my mother; (6) I frequently recall faces with vividness, *but not at will*; (7) I can recall the features of males better than of females; (8) I can only recall the features of those who have been lately seen; (9) There are a few persons very well known to me whose features I absolutely cannot recall, and it is very annoying; (10) I can recall readily persons, friends and relations; (11) I can recall all quite distinctly, but those with whom I am associating every day, with more distinctness than others, as my classmates at college better than my friends at home.

Various as these cases are, a more deliberate view of them suggests a number of underlying principles which give a distinctive character to the imagery of each person and are not beyond our finding out; beneath these principles are still deeper causes quite beyond present search. Let us look at some of these cases more carefully. Number 8 is a person whose imaging power in general is quite high; he resembles number 11 in his images of persons; they are bright soon after they are formed, but when some weeks have elapsed they lose distinctness. Another writer says: "To every rule I can lay down I can find exceptions, but I think this is absolutely true: for a few days after seeing a face I can recall it more or less clearly; gradually I lose the power, and after a week at the longest I am unable to bring it back." Numbers 3, 4, and 10 may also be grouped; the more frequently

they see a face, the more difficult it is for them to visualise it. Numbers 1 and 10 give testimony which is directly opposed to this. Number 5 is a somewhat exceptional case, but it is confirmed by others, one of whom writes: "I can see all relatives with whom I have been very intimate, distinctly. Yet there are two or three persons with whom I am nearly as intimate as with my parents, and I cannot visualise them at all distinctly." Others who form clear images of natural scenery say they cannot see faces at all. Number 6 speaks of his difficulty in recalling faces at the moment when he wishes to do so; others say the same. Their images defy the most determined effort to bring them forth at one moment and flash out spontaneously the next.

In one's images of persons it is obvious that the obstacles lie both in the original impression and in the recalling power. Of some faces which perhaps lack individuality we can make no clear mental record at all; or perhaps the record is clear for some days or weeks and then is either obliterated or it refuses our summons; or, again, we form a clear mental record of a face the first time we see it, and after seeing it a number of times the individual records confuse each other. Then our recalling power may be wholly at fault, images may elude us altho we are confident we possess them. It follows that in many cases we cannot decide where the responsibility lies, whether the recording or recalling power is out of gear; if an image occasionally refuses the summons of the will what a short step it is to its never appearing before the mind's eye voluntarily, and just as we are inferring that we do not possess it, some extraordinary stimulus brings it forth. Phantasies which arise in the mind uncalled for are not only of little service to us, but are inconsistent with close thinking; we therefore, as students, avoid them; when we cease to exercise our will-power upon our visualising faculty, we take the first step towards losing what may become an invaluable ally of study. Images under control are as useful as mere day-dreams are worthless. Replies to *Question 6* from a number of advanced students illustrate how variable is the tenure of the will over our imagery:

"Since I came to college my images have been almost wholly voluntary, formerly they came at random;" "Distinct images rarely, confused images

frequently, come involuntarily: the latter may be made more clear by especial attention;" "Very often I cannot drive such images from me;" "My brightest images come when I do not call them; some faces which I can never recall come unasked."

As to the trouble which many experience in recalling faces as compared with more stable objects, M. Taine, among other writers, offers the correct explanation: "And so when I think of a person, I know my memory wavers between twenty different expressions, smiling, serious, unhappy, the face bent on one side or the other." Several students write that when they are unable to recall a face they try to visualise a photograph of it; here the image is strengthened by repetition since the original never varies. Nevertheless it is probably true of imagery as of memory for abstract facts, that the repeated impressions even of a fixed object may sometimes tend to obliterate each other. Various other devices are resorted to to assist a feeble imaging power. Some construct a face by a halting process, adding feature to feature until the whole is complete. Analogous to this is the statement of one student that when in poor health he can only see a portion of a face, say three or four of the features at a time. Galton has treated of these peculiarities quite fully.

A question enters here which is of the greatest interest. Does the mind ever automatically blend the different memories of a face or of a number of different faces into one generalized image, or can such a blending be effected by any voluntary or conscious process? Have we, for example, an image for the class Chinaman which is not taken from any particular individual that we have seen, but is a resultant of the faces of a number of Chinamen? In other words, have mental pictures been formed by any process which corresponds even in a remote degree to a composite photograph taken from a number of faint impressions superposed? It is true we unconsciously combine separate features of different faces or landscapes, or, as frequently happens where memory is indistinct, we may mistake a general resemblance for identity; but such pictures, which are among the ordinary products of imagination, are radically distinct from a composite, which as a whole resembles all, but in its parts is unlike each. Mr. Galton, if we understand him aright, answers this question in the affirmative, but it seems to us still open to very

considerable doubt. Is it not probable, among other explanations that might be offered, that such memories may be of particular scenes or faces which we mistake for generalized images because we cannot locate them, the reference points of associated time or space having been forgotten?

There can be no doubt that the mind's eye ordinarily reverts consciously or unconsciously to the appearance or expression of a particular moment.

"Accuracy and distinctness decrease," says one writer, "as I depart from particular instances." Another says, "I try to remember some vivid experience in which that person figured conspicuously; I can then recall the exact expression of the face as it appeared when it engrossed my attention."

Others rely upon association with a particular locality, dress, or attitude of the body. This for example is apt to be the case with mothers when they try to recall their children at different periods of life.

"There is an absence of flexibility," writes Mr. Galton, "in the mental imagery of most persons. They find that the first image they have acquired is apt to hold its place tenaciously in spite of subsequent need of correction." In imaging a friend's face the favorite or most frequent expression naturally rises. We have met two cases which illustrate the occasional obstinacy of our visual memory. One often hears the expression "rooting out old ideas;" the same phrase may be aptly applied to images. In the first case the substitution of a later for an earlier image progressed without the subject's being at all aware of it.

"I recall a lady aged about twenty-five," says the writer, "who lost her father when she was twenty. An artist was subsequently engaged to paint a portrait of her father from an old photograph. He made many changes at the suggestion of friends and relations so as to make it conform as nearly as possible to the appearance before death. Said this lady, 'It is a poor likeness, and does not look like my father at all.' She was accustomed to call up his image as he sat in his usual seat, but he always bore the image he bore before death. In about two years she discovered that she could only recall her father with the likeness which he bore in the painting. From association she had become familiar with the picture and gradually lost the true image of her father. It was just as easy to recall him, but when she did so he looked exactly as he did in the picture, and she could not summon his face at all as it appeared in life."

The second case is a remarkable one, and is well authenticated; we give the writer's account of it:

"A year or two ago I was suffering from near-sightedness and seeing everything double. I had an operation performed by Dr. A., which, with the use of glasses, restored my eyesight and corrected the imperfect co-ordination. If I attempt to recall scenes that I saw while my eyes were out of order I invariably see them as they appeared during that time, altho I may have seen them many times since the operation. For instance, in the case of the minister in the pulpit at home I see two images of him, no matter how much I may try to get rid of one of them. My recollections of the Examination hall and of the Examiner, upon entrance to college, are affected in the same way, altho I have since attended several courses of lectures in that room. When I think of the Examiner, his several positions are all very clear, but all double. My recollection of the office in which the operation was performed is also of everything as double, altho I saw it only twice before the restoration of my sight and many times after. The objects which I have seen since the operation are always single when recalled."

The images formed in childhood are with most persons clearer, brighter, and more numerous than those of later years. Among twenty-eight students three believe that their powers of imagery have improved, thirteen say that they have not varied, twelve say that they have diminished. This is due in many cases to disuse, for there can be no doubt that the elaborate imagery of some older minds is far more wonderful than anything found among children. Children's images, apart from the natural strength of their Phantasy, are vivid because they see form, color, and outline dissociated from any distracting ideas which would enter the mind of an adult. A child looks at a pony engrossed with its external characters, rough coat, long mane, and so on without thought of price, age, or disposition. This concentration and simplicity of the mental concept affects the memory as sharp focussing affects a sensitive plate. The earliest images recalled from childhood are amusingly trifling; they are often of objects which touched the childish vanity, such as the first long trousers or new blue dress, the first day at school, the first steamboat. But it is unquestionable that besides these little events which can be recalled there are images stamped upon our childish minds which are only roused years afterwards by some strong *instigation*.

Our very earliest recollections are in the form of images, not of abstractions. Judging from the average obtained from many writers, most persons can recall one or two scenes of their fourth year, a few can recall objects which were seen between the second and third year. One lady writes :

"When I was eighteen years old I suddenly recalled a vivid picture seen from a steamer deck while held by my nurse, the oblique lattice below the steamer rail and the silver reflection of the moon on the water forming a path over the lake. I learned from my mother subsequently that I was nineteen months old at the time, and was on a journey over Lake Chautauqua."

We have other cases which are similar. Carpenter gives an instance of visual memory extending back to the age of eighteen months. Still earlier impressions may have been recorded by others. The suspicion in regard to such early images is that where the associations are forgotten we cannot be assured of their genuineness. They may either be of objective or subjective origin, the former produced on the retina by external objects, the latter mere coinage of the imagination. We can clearly visualise our dreams, and conscientious as our self-scrutiny is, such visualisations may be mistaken for images of real objects. Here is the key to the ludicrous mistake which young people sometimes fall into of insisting upon their recollection of scenes which happened before their birth, as in the case of a little boy who declared he had been present at his mother's wedding, "because he saw it all so plainly."

One point worth reverting to here is the evidence we have of images recorded in the mind, which, if ever recalled, arise so vaguely that our consciousness only gets the dimmest glance at them; they suffice merely to give us a vague sense of recognition. Hawthorne, in "Our Old Home," describes his first visit to Stanton Harcourt, near Oxford. All the interior details of the famous old kitchen seemed unaccountably familiar to him; there was no freshness or sense of novelty about it, and he was quite at a loss to account for his apparent familiarity with the place. Several weeks afterwards he suddenly recollected that when only eleven years old he had read Pope's description of the kitchen. The vivid subjective image formed at the time had never been effaced.

The mistaking of images for reality is as common among children as it is rare among adults. In advancing age we become skeptical, not only of facts, but appearances: every mental state runs under a fire of scrutiny; we have acquired a hearty contempt for visual deceptions of every sort as implying a lack of mental control and contrary to the whole tendency of good education. An image attains the force of reality only when the faculty has the ascendancy over every other; when the attention is riveted upon the object, the gates to the outer world are fast closed, and we are in a world of phantasy. Illustrating how liable we are to sense-deception while in this strongly subjective state is the following:

"Once after reading of Lady Dedlock in a chapter describing a stormy evening in 'Bleak House,' I took an umbrella to go out, and was surprised to find it a clear night; I was positive I had heard the rain on the windows." Again, "Once, while seated in my room reading, I thought I heard some one sweeping in the next room, the door between being open. Finally the dust became so disagreeable as to cause me to cough; I arose to close the door, and was surprised to find the supposed noise of sweeping was made by a dog's tail wagging on a straw matting not far from me."

A thoughtful reply to *Question 6* may be quoted here: "I realize that a mental image is formed within the mind and thence projected outwards—a reversed process which I could never mistake for reality. The image is of a different nature and effect from that of a real object." With children there is no such sifting process. We find numerous examples of their deception; similar stories to the one below are often met with in family lore:

"I have been told," says the writer, "that when I was a small child I possessed an imaginary friend, to whom I was often overheard talking an hour at a time, and apparently satisfied with the reality of the conversation. Having ceased to speak of or to this imaginary friend for some time, I was asked what had become of him. I answered that he had been killed in the war (then raging), and was never heard referring to him again. I have only been told this by my family, and cannot tell how far I was myself deceived."

We have been dealing thus far with visualisations of color and form; the replies to *Question 4* have given us an opportunity of comparing these with the recalled sensations of touch,

taste, sound, and smell. Only a few persons can recall odors; one writer asserts, on the other hand, that odors are the most vivid of all his recalled sensations. Touches are the next rarest, then sound, then color, while form is most frequently recalled. Of twenty-five writers, all say they can recall form in some degree, and two thirds of these recall form more distinctly than anything else which comes to the senses. Colors, according to this series of replies, can be fairly recalled by about two persons out of three, but not so vividly as form. With only one fourth the number was the recalling of form and color equal; with one tenth was the recalling of form, color, and sounds equal. Those who recalled sounds could in few instances recall colors readily, and in many cases there was a vivid recollection of color with a dim idea of form, or *vice versa*. Nineteen could recall form best, eleven could recall colors best or as well as form, nine for sounds, three for touches, and two for odors. These proportions probably indicate but roughly those which would be obtained from a larger number of persons. Among individuals they partly attest the relative inborn acuteness of the various senses, as well as individual preferences for certain qualities of objects; objects of distaste are naturally suppressed from our imagery as far as we can control it; throughout all is the principle so well brought out by Mr. Galton that our powers of reviving the impressions of different senses are very uneven.

There seems to be no invariable correlation between power of imaging objects and that of reviving states of mind or feeling, (*Question 11*); while many persons possess both, others vividly recall emotions with no power of imagery, or the reverse. In the original impress upon the mind they are somewhat akin. A careworn face rouses a sudden sympathy; associated together, the face and the emotion make a lasting stamp on the memory. Why are they dissociated in their revival, the sympathy actually, perhaps painfully, felt again; the face perchance a mere recollection, as of a dry fact with no mental picture? This is an unexplainable inequality in the action of the reproductive powers, which is without question characteristic of many minds.

Here are two instances selected from a number :

"I can only recall states of mind with a great effort, and then imperfectly, the results being of a volatile character. In recalling natural scenery the image is fairly clear, the objects are defined pretty much as they are in nature, and the colors are quite distinct."

"I recall emotions or states of mind much more vividly than images of external objects. The image of my room at college is very dim, few of the objects are well defined at once, and I have little power over color in my images."

It is a familiar fact that images have certain physiological and emotional states, as the condition of their making a strong impression upon the memory; but it is a curious and rather unlooked-for truth, that similar states of body and mind effect very diverse results in different people. With the majority, the various stronger emotions are associated with the formation of lasting images; with one person, joy gives rise to the most vivid pictures; with another, sorrow; but the brightest pictures are formed in some minds when undisturbed by physical or emotional excitement.

"When the mind has been in a perfect state of relaxation," says one writer, "I have formed nearly all the images which I can now recall." Another writes: "The state of mind in which the most vivid images were formed was one of rest, when I could take in slowly or comprehensively the occurring events."

So with our physical states, their influences are quite as diverse. Our facility in recalling natural scenery is undoubtedly due in some measure to the healthy lung action of out-door exercise and pure air, and resulting purity of blood circulating in the brain. A member of a Hare and Hounds Club speaks of the accuracy with which he recalls the minutest details of a stretch of country covered by a long run; while after repeated trials the interior of his college room rose in a very confused manner before his mind's eye. With many persons, on the other hand, bodily exercise is not conducive to the clear exercise of this faculty. "I can bring objects most clearly before my mind," writes one student, "when nervous stimuli are aroused and muscular are not."

In this paper a mere outline has been given of the information which we have received. Abundant as our material is, it

would still appear that we are merely upon the threshold of the knowledge which this method of psychological research opens out. The meagreness of what has been already learned is apparent when one thinks of the countless similar channels of inquiry as yet untried.

HENRY F. OSBORN.

III.

So far Professor Osborn. I have a few remarks to make in closing.

There are mistakes in some of the replies, arising from a failure to apprehend the relation between the visualising or imaging power and memory. The phantasy is an element in memory. There may be images without any recognition of time in our past experience; but in all memory there is a representation of the object. When the query is put, "What sort of image have we of an emotion, say of fear?" the person answering thinks we are asking about a figure, and says he has nothing of the kind, whereas he has a very vivid remembrance of his fear as a mental affection.

There is often a vagueness in the answers because there is no test to apply. If we put the question, "Was the day cold?" to a number of persons, we may get discordant answers when they trust to their sensations, and do not try them by a thermometer. In like manner, when the question is put, Was your idea of such a thing vivid? we are apt to get varied answers.

This article is meant to be a contribution to a psychological subject which invites to further investigation. It proceeds on the method which Bacon held in view: "Does any one doubt (rather than object) whether we speak merely of natural philosophy, or of the other sciences also, such as logics, ethics, politics, as about to be perfected by our method?" "We certainly," he replies, "understand all these things which have been referred to; and like as the vulgar logic which regulates things by the syllogism pertains not to the natural but all science, so ours which proceeds by induction embraces them all. For thus we would form a history and tables concerning anger, fear, modesty and the like, as also examples of civil affairs, not omitting the mental emotions of memory, composition, divi-

sion, judgment, and the rest, just as we form such of heat and cold, of light, vegetation, and such like." Investigations on this plan are diligently pursued in the present day: as an example we have Prof. Stanley Hall's article in this REVIEW (May, 1883). I rejoice in these researches as throwing light on secondary and subsidiary topics of deep interest. But I deny that this is the only or the main method in which the mind is to be studied. After all, we come to know what perceptions are, what judgments, reasonings, remorse, hopes, fears, resolves are, by self-consciousness or the internal sense. The statistical or tabular method is to be called in as auxiliary to the other.

JAMES McCOSH.

THE MORROW OF THE GLADSTONE ADMINISTRATION.

ONE is sometimes obliged to contemplate that which one least desires to occur. The Gladstone Ministry has, we are convinced, been of the very greatest advantage to England, to Europe, to the world. It has checked "jingoism"—it has substituted moderation and a regard for the rights of others, in the place of a cynical assertion of supreme indifference to anything but self-interest. Europe and America equally see in the continuance of Mr. Gladstone in office a pledge for the continuance of peace. It is just possible that a Gladstone Ministry may "drift into war;" but it is, morally speaking, quite impossible that it should desire war, provoke war, or continue war unnecessarily. Recent years have seen, instead of a restless egotism, bent on astounding the world by vast projects, strange *coups de théâtre*, and novel phrases, a recurrence to the justice, calmness, and reticence which were the characteristics of English policy towards foreign countries in former times. Mr. Gladstone is one of the few statesmen who can control the British lion in his bellicose humors, can induce him to own himself in the wrong, and, if need be, to apologize. His ministry favors at once external peace and internal tranquillity. It is conservative without being reactionary, progressive without paving the way for revolution. England and the world at large are to be congratulated on a rule that is strong without being provocative, and conciliatory without inviting attack.

But alas! it is too true that "all things come to an end"—dynasties, states, nations. Least of all are ministries exempt from the common doom. In France, since Sedan, the average duration of a government has been six months. In England ministerial longevity is somewhat greater; but still the average

term falls considerably short of three years. In the fifty-three years from 1827 to 1880—which is the period over which our recollection extends—the number of ministries has been nineteen. Thus, on the mere doctrine of averages, and apart from any special considerations, the Gladstone Administration, which came into office in November, 1880, should now—October, 1883—be approaching its term. It has already surpassed in duration eleven ministries out of the last nineteen. It must be exceptionally vigorous if it is to last much longer.

Unfortunately, instead of exceptional vigor, there attaches to it an element of exceptional weakness in the advanced age of its head. Mr. Gladstone was born in the year 1809, and is consequently now seventy-four years of age. He has been in Parliament for above fifty years. Equally indefatigable in office and in opposition, he has had cares on his shoulders during the whole of that extended period, which would have utterly worn out any ordinary man. He has been the chief speaker of every government whereof he has formed a part. He has familiarized himself with every branch of administration. He has mastered the deepest problems of finance. Literature has occupied him scarcely less than politics; and each interval between his terms of office has been marked by the production of a book. The words “rest” and “holiday” convey no meaning to his ears, or at any rate he does not conceive of them as having any personal application to himself. We have known him, at the close of a session longer and more exhausting than usual, when the world imagined that he was doing nothing but inhaling sea-breezes or wandering upon Welsh mountain-sides, rush headlong into the study of a German quarto of eight hundred pages on the derivation of certain tribes in Albania from the Pelasgi. However magnificent the *physique* with which nature endowed him at the first, it is impossible that time and toil should not have impaired it, or that he can continue to make the calls, which he is always making, upon it for long. He has often spoken of retirement. Tho his mind is as vigorous as ever, and the maxim, “*Solve senescentem mature sanus equum,*” has no application at present to his intellectual powers, yet he would do well to spare the feebler physical nature, which cannot but have been weakened by the wear and tear of years.

It may be expected that ere long the advice of physicians and the tender concern of close friends and near relatives will prevail to bring about the retirement so often announced, so imprudently delayed, so regrettable, yet so necessary. If Mr. Gladstone will consent to take moderate care of his health, his friends may look to see him exceed the term of life laid down for "the strong" by the Psalmist, and perhaps outlive the century. So long as he lives he will be a political force, affecting the world by his written, if not by his spoken, oratory. And he may do good service in literature also. His *Homeric Studies* are still incomplete, and would be improved by compression and rearrangement. There was a time when he meditated a "Life of Homer"—an exhibition of the man as he reveals himself to the careful student of his works. May not the literary world still hope to receive this gift from his hands? It would fitly close the literary career begun at Oxford, and covering more than half a century.

Such being the situation, politicians both in Europe and in America are asking, "What next, and next?" What is to happen when Mr. Gladstone ceases to lead his party, and accepts the retirement he has so well earned? What is the Future of Parties and Politics? Who is the Liberal "coming man"?

There are four persons who stand out from among the statesmen of the Liberal party as politicians of large capacity, to whom the task of forming a government might conceivably be entrusted—Lord Granville, Lord Hartington, Sir William Harcourt, and Mr. Chamberlain. Lord Granville is conciliation itself. Not only has he never made himself an enemy, but he has gained the affection of almost all who have ever been brought into contact with him. He is an excellent speaker,—judicious, ready, persuasive, winning,—a good administrator, and a most amiable man. He would find no difficulty in obtaining colleagues. His appointment would be popular abroad. But he is not a strong man. His Liberalism is of a very mild type. He is not gifted with the power of exercising ascendancy over others. A cabinet under his gentle rule might soon develop irreconcilable differences for want of proper control. Moreover, his position as a member of the Upper House is against him; since the time of Sir Robert Peel it has been

an accepted tradition, more especially with the Liberal party, that the Prime Minister ought to be in the House of Commons. These reasons have operated in the past to prevent the formation of a ministry from being entrusted to Lord Granville, and they will probably continue to operate in the future. The conjuncture must be a very peculiar one which would lead to the construction of a Granville Cabinet; and nothing points to such a conjuncture at present.

Sir William Harcourt's qualifications for the office of Liberal leader are almost exactly the opposite to those which recommend Earl Granville. Sir William is essentially a strong man. His views are pronounced and decided. In action he is prompt and bold. In speech he is as ready as his brother secretary; but he despises conciliation—he is hard, bitter, cutting. Every one has heard the story of the three *blast* dinner-givers, who, desirous of a new sensation, agreed to dine together at their club, and each to invite for the occasion the most disagreeable man of his acquaintance. The day came, and only one guest made his appearance, the three hosts having each invited the same person. The story has been told no doubt at different times of a hundred different individuals: just now in London society it attaches to Sir William Harcourt. The fact is that Sir William is too plain-spoken to make many friends. He is not mealy-mouthed. When under the excitement of strong feeling, or even sometimes without that excuse, he uses hard words—he calls a spade a spade, and not “an agricultural implement.” Thus he is what is called “unpopular.” Men respect him, fear him; but they do not love him. Were he entrusted by her Majesty with the task of forming an administration, he might have some difficulty in obtaining colleagues. Men will serve with him, but would feel a reluctance to serve under him. Further, he is by education and early practice a lawyer; and there is a prejudice in England against lawyers for the first post in the kingdom. Lawyers, of late years, have not even been allowed to lead the Commons. Great as are Sir William Harcourt's abilities, and excellent as has been his conduct of the Home Office for the last three years, clever and powerful as have been his speeches, bold and brave as has been his demeanor towards the disaffected, he can scarcely look to obtain

the highest position open to a British subject, being a lawyer, whatever his merits.

Lord Hartington's claims to be considered when the vacancy in the leadership occurs are too obvious to need much exposition. He has twenty years of administrative experience; has been Postmaster-General, Chief Secretary for Ireland, Secretary of State for War, and Secretary of State for India; he led the opposition in the House of Commons during Mr. Gladstone's semi-retirement from 1876 to 1880; and he was sent for by the Queen to form a ministry in the last-named year. It is admitted even by his political opponents, that he "might then have formed a ministry with the entire approval of the people" of England, having "thoroughly well earned success and deserved it." He would be accepted with equal readiness now. Tho not an eloquent speaker, he is a fair debater; he has judgment, tact, and self-restraint. He has won the confidence of the Liberal party by a straightforward and fearless honesty, as well as by a rare readiness to yield his own claims to those of others. Members of Parliament feel that they can thoroughly depend upon him. To what he has once pledged himself he will adhere, "tho it were to his own hindrance." There is no one in the Lower House who is better liked, whether by his own party, or by that to which he is opposed.

There is, however, one obstacle to his adoption as the Liberal leader. Lord Hartington, tho now in the House of Commons, is the heir to a dukedom, and his father, the Duke of Devonshire, is seventy-five years of age. The selection of the noble Marquis for leader of his party would either be a temporary arrangement, a postponement of any real solution of the existing difficulty, or it would involve at no remote date a departure from the political maxim, that the head of an administration should be in the Commons.

Under these circumstances it is not to be wondered at that the eyes of some Liberal politicians have been turned towards Mr. Chamberlain. Mr. Chamberlain, tho young as a man and still younger as a statesman, is a man of vigor and power, one of the best speakers in the House of Commons, and, according to the *Quarterly Review* (July, 1883), "the foremost representative of the Radical school." He first became generally

known as chairman of the Birmingham School Board, an office which he held from 1873 to 1876. In the last-named of these years Birmingham elected him as one of her members; and it is thus little more than seven years since he entered on the Parliamentary arena. He rapidly, however, won his spurs, and when the Gladstone Ministry was formed in April, 1880, it surprised no one that he was selected by the Premier for the important office of President of the Board of Trade. Mr. Chamberlain has since distinguished himself, partly by his speeches in the House, but still more by his extra-parliamentary utterances, which however have been more remarkable for their boldness than for their discretion. It is early for him to be put forward as a possible future Premier; but he is certainly so put forward by his friends, and in forecasting coming political changes we must of necessity take into account his pretensions.

Such being the candidates for the post of successor to Mr. Gladstone whom circumstances, or their friends, put forward at the present time, it follows to inquire which of them is most likely to obtain the preference. Now here we touch upon somewhat delicate ground. It is the prerogative of the Queen, on occasion of a vacancy in the office of Prime Minister, however produced, to summon to her presence any one out of the whole number of her subjects, and lay her commands upon him to attempt the formation of a ministry. There have been times when personal likings or dislikes, recollection of past quarrels, anger at supposed slights, have been allowed to actuate the sovereign at such a moment, and to determine the person for whom he should send. But nothing of this kind is at present to be feared. Her Gracious Majesty Queen Victoria has shown herself throughout the whole of her reign the most constitutional of sovereigns. She has suffered no personal motive to step in between herself and her duty. Beyond a doubt she will send for the individual who, when the vacancy occurs, shall be pointed out by the circumstances of the time as the proper one. On the last occasion, in April, 1880, she sent for the Marquis of Hartington. The Marquis has been blamed for not jumping at her offer, and told that in declining to undertake the formation of a cabinet, and recommending Her Majesty to summon Mr. Gladstone to her counsels, he let slip a chance which

will never come back to him again. But the bold prophet who makes this prediction is not infallible. The Marquis rose rather than fell in the estimation of most people by his act of self-renunciation and self-denial. It has yet to be proved that Her Majesty viewed his conduct differently. With the exception of a few bitter partisans, politicians of all shades are agreed that in the year 1880 Mr. Gladstone was the indispensable man. No ministry could have stood without him, and in no ministry of which he formed a part could he have been less than head. Lord Hartington discharged a plain duty in informing Her Majesty of the true position of affairs, and would have failed in his duty if he had not done so. He gave the Queen excellent advice; and his conduct in the past proves his fitness to be her chief adviser in the future.

If Her Majesty has shortly to exert once more her constitutional privilege of selecting her Prime Minister, it will be natural for her thoughts to revert to the noble lord whom she honored by her preference in 1880. It is possible, however, that she may be differently advised. When a Prime Minister resigns his office on any ground whatever, it becomes his privilege and his duty to advise the sovereign as to his successor. Lord Beaconsfield in 1880 recommended the Queen to send for the Marquis of Hartington; and Mr. Gladstone, if he resigns, must point out some person or persons to Her Majesty as suited for the position which will become vacant. The Queen is not bound to take his advice, but it is his duty to offer it. And in doing so he may either recommend strongly a single individual, or he may point out that there are several fully qualified persons, who would probably be willing to undertake the task, and leave Her Majesty to make her choice among them.

It is supposed by some that Mr. Gladstone, tho he began his political life as a Conservative, has now strong Radical leanings, and that he would regard Mr. Chamberlain—"the foremost representative of the Radical school"—as his most fit successor. Who but Mr. Chamberlain, it is said, can be counted on to carry out that programme of reforms, duly signed by Mr. Gladstone and published in the *Nineteenth Century*, which has been thus summarized:

1. London Municipal Reform; 2. County Government; 3. County Franchise; 4. Liquor Laws; 5. Irish Borough Franchise; 6. Irish University Question; 7. Opium Revenue; 8. Criminal Law Procedure; 9. Responsibility of Masters for Injury to Workmen; 10. Reduction of Public Expenditure; 11. Probate Duty; 12. Indian Finance; 13. Working of the Home Government of India; 14. City Companies; 15. Burial Laws; 16. Valuation of Property; 17. Law of the Medical Profession; 18. Law of Entail and Settlement; 19. Corrupt Practices at Elections; 20. Expenses of Elections; 21. Reorganization of the Revenue Departments; 22. The Currency; 23. Law of Bankruptcy; 24. Law of Banking; 25. Law of Distress; 26. Law of Charities and Mortmain; 27. Loans for Local Purposes; 28. Game Laws; 29. Distribution as well as Redistribution of Seats; 30. Savings Banks Finance; 31. The Bright Clauses of the Irish Land Act.

Who but Mr. Chamberlain can secure that support of the advanced Liberals, without which the party is powerless, and must yield place to its rivals? Mr. Chamberlain, we are assured, is "the Coming Man"—the probable next Prime Minister. He will be recommended by Mr. Gladstone and accepted by the Queen; he will dissolve Parliament, obtain a Radical majority, and direct the destinies of England for the next ten, fifteen, or twenty years.

Certainly, if there is any reasonable prospect of such a result, the outlook is serious. Mr. Chamberlain's views may not be so pronounced as they are assumed to be, and time may modify them, as his mind and judgment ripen. Most people become more conservative as they grow older. But Mr. Chamberlain's present opinions are assuredly such as, if carried into action, would cause, or perhaps we should rather say constitute, a revolution. Mr. Chamberlain has declared himself in favor of manhood suffrage, equal electoral districts, and the payment of Members of Parliament out of the general revenue of the country. He believes the Church of England to have been a continual hindrance to all political and intellectual progress, and holds that the Liberal party "will be blind to the teachings of the present, and deaf to the evidence of the past, if they do not take the first opportunity to remove that perpetual stumbling-block" out of the way. He is opposed to the existing Land laws, and would have them completely remodelled. He thinks that "the present condition of things with regard to land involves a great injury and wrong to the laborers employed on

the soil." What alterations he would make we have not been told; but we see no reason to doubt that they would be violent and sweeping. Perhaps the responsibility which attaches to power, and the hesitation naturally felt by every one who has to translate thought into act, might have a sobering effect, if from President of the Board of Trade Mr. Chamberlain became First Lord of the Treasury and Prime Minister, and the course of action which he would then pursue might fall very far short of the programme published to the world in the Bradford and Rochdale speeches; but the risk is too great, the harm that might be done too vast and irremediable, for us to contemplate with calmness the supposed probability of the Queen's choice of a Premier to replace Mr. Gladstone falling upon the junior member for Birmingham.

We do not believe that Mr. Gladstone will make the recommendation which is supposed. Tho it suits the purpose of the Tory party to represent the existing Prime Minister as a Radical and a revolutionist, opposed to all the time-honored institutions of the country, and at heart a foe to monarchy itself, a calm and dispassionate consideration of his political course will easily convince any reasonable man that the facts are otherwise. Mr. Gladstone began his public life as a "Peelite," or Moderate Conservative, and remained firmly attached to Sir Robert Peel up to the day of his death. It was as a "Peelite" that he entered the Ministry of Lord Aberdeen in 1852; and tho subsequently he joined the ranks of the Liberal party, and consented to hold office under Lord Palmerston and Earl Russell, yet a substratum of Conservatism has always underlain his Liberal opinions. It is true that he devised the Succession Duty, for which the landed interest has never forgiven him, and probably never will forgive; but otherwise his name is coupled with no measure which has even seemed to be levelled against the aristocratic class. He has been led on to measures from which he would once have shrunk, but only when public opinion anticipated him and demanded the change. The concessions which he has made in Ireland are not concessions to democracy, but to Nationalism, and have been granted with the object of stopping disaffection, not of injuring landlords. Mr. Gladstone has upheld the Church, the House of Lords, and the Crown, at

a time when large numbers of Liberals denounced them and predicted their downfall. He has strengthened, if not even enlarged, the royal prerogative on more than one occasion, has upheld the dignity of the Peerage by rare and well-deserved creations of new Peers, and has done much to increase the popularity of the Church by a series of excellent ecclesiastical appointments. In opening the churchyards to all he did indeed make a step towards dis-establishment; and if the English were a logical people, the step might have been a fatal one, but as they are not, the concession has done little harm, and is likely to do little harm. The disservice thus done the Church has been small, and it has been amply compensated by the appointment of the Cathedrals and Ecclesiastical Courts Commissions—the one calculated to popularize and invigorate cathedral establishments, the other to remedy crying evils and prevent conflicts between the Church and the law. Mr. Gladstone has won confidence as much by what he has refused to do as by what he has done; he has accepted no democratic nostrums, has abstained from tinkering the Constitution. His great triumphs have been administrative and financial. Accepting the principle of free trade, he has remodelled and simplified the tariff till it presses upon no industry and hampers no branch of commerce; he has kept the balance even between direct and indirect taxation, and has thus made the "Upper Ten Thousand" and the masses contribute respectively their due shares to the revenue; he has steered clear of a graduated income tax; he has not threatened the bishops; he has not denounced landlordism; he has not spoken of the House of Lords as an effete institution. Briefly, his policy has been constructive rather than destructive, and his aim to make the various parts of the political machine work better together rather than to pull it to pieces.

It is not at all clear, therefore, that Mr. Gladstone would desire the advent to power of any statesman who entertained opinions resembling those of Mr. Chamberlain. It is one thing to accept an advanced Radical as a colleague in a ministry, and to assign him a subordinate place; it is quite another to lend a helping hand towards his elevation to the post of Premier. And Mr. Chamberlain's own antecedents scarcely mark him out so clearly for the position as to render it necessary that he should

be pressed on the Crown by a retiring ministry of a very different way of thinking. Premiers are not usually chosen from among those whose parliamentary experience extends over no more than seven years, or from those whose official life is limited to three. Transcendent merit raised the younger Pitt to the headship of a ministry when he was as new to Parliament in 1783, and very exceptional merit might do the same now that the world is a century older. But can it be said, even by his greatest admirers, that Mr. Chamberlain's merits are so very exceptional? Mr. Chamberlain is a ready, but scarcely an eloquent, speaker. He "has the ear" of the House, but not more than twenty other members. He is not wanting in parliamentary tact, and certainly piloted the Bankruptcy Bill through the shoals and quicksands that threatened it in the Grand Committee with considerable skill and discretion. But discretion is not his strong point generally. It is scarcely discreet to offend Churchmen, who are still a majority, and are likely soon to be a very large majority, of the electors, by describing the Church as "a political manufactured, State-made machine," and "a hindrance to all political and intellectual progress." It is not very discreet to declare war at one and the same time against the Church and the Land, and to proclaim, "I care little which of these great questions we attack first." We doubt if it is discreet to advocate the payment of members of Parliament, for where one elector may entertain the hope of making profit by such an arrangement, there will be hundreds to feel that it will take a certain sum out of their pockets. Mr. Chamberlain is chiefly noticeable at present for the loud and bold avowal of extreme opinions at public meetings and on the hustings, combined with a profound silence on such topics within the walls of the House of Commons. He has been called "the People's Tribune," but he has done nothing as yet to deserve the title; he has not associated his name with any law, unless it be with that for the detection and punishment of fraudulent bankrupts.

We do not believe then in Mr. Chamberlain as "the coming Premier." We hold that "the wish" has been "father to the thought" where the thought has been honestly entertained. We believe, further, that publicity has been given to the thought mainly by those who have not honestly entertained it, but have

wished to cause a general scare throughout the upper classes by the "bogy" of a Chamberlain administration. In love and war all stratagems are considered to be fair; and the exigencies of political strife will always be regarded as justifying the publication of simulated apprehensions. Mr. Chamberlain's claims and prospects are paraded before our eyes with the object of inducing us to lend our aid towards giving the Tories a majority in the next Parliament.

Setting Mr. Chamberlain aside, the candidates for the leadership of the Liberal party, in the event of Mr. Gladstone's retirement, are reduced to three—Lord Granville, Lord Hartington, and Sir William Harcourt; and we regard it as almost certain that one of these three will be the next Liberal Premier. The exact position of affairs at the time when the retirement occurs may to some extent affect the selection; but, unless something very unexpected should occur, we think that the Queen's choice will fall on the Marquis of Hartington.

Having thus settled, so far as we are able, the personal problem, let us further ask, What is likely to be the effect of the impending change on parties, and what influence it may be expected to exert on England's internal and external policy?

There are some who tell us that the existing political parties in England will have to be completely broken up, and then recast and reorganized. Others declare their belief that the result will infallibly be the dissolution of the Liberal party—the absolute and final separation of the Whig section from the Radicals. The writers who advocate this view maintain that Mr. Gladstone is, and has long been, the sole bond of union between the two sections of Liberals, and that his removal from the political arena must be followed by an immediate disruption. The Radicals, they say, are utterly sick of the Whigs, whom they regard as a "Venetian Oligarchy;" they are increasing in strength, and they know it; they have come to despise their weak-kneed allies, and no longer care to dissemble their feelings; they want the "loaves and fishes" of office for themselves, and do not care to share them with colleagues who always contrive to take the lion's portion and leave them the ass's—they are anxious, and intend to get rid of their Whig allies, believing themselves strong enough to do without them. Mr. Gladstone's retirement

will be the signal for the "break-up"—Radicalism will disencumber itself of the old man who has so long sat upon its shoulders, and will set up "on its own hook," leaving Whiggery "out in the cold" to follow what course it pleases. Then will the Whigs be "dished" indeed; and the professors of the "pure faith" of Radicalism will go in and possess the good things which have been too long the heritage of the "weaker brethren."

For our own part we do not anticipate any such consequences. We see no reason to believe that Radicalism is gaining in strength, or that the Radicals are so foolish as to imagine that they have the ball at their feet and can dispense with their old confederates. The band which connects the two sections of the Liberal party is not, in our opinion, Mr. Gladstone, but necessity. Neither section can do without the other. There is still a vast amount of Conservatism in England, and the "Conservative Reaction," of which so many writers in Tory newspapers are wont to speak, is not altogether an unreality. Reactions in political feelings or leanings are continually taking place among the electors; and, while the firm adherents of the two main political creeds are tolerably evenly balanced, the unstable mass of those who have no strong attachments and no very definite views is continually changing its side. The elections of 1873 and 1880 have shown what little dependence can be placed on a large proportion of the electors, and how readily and lightly they transfer their weight from one scale to the other. It will not at all surprise us if at the next General Election—which cannot be farther off than three or four years hence—the Conservatives have a majority. Now, so long as this contingency looms up as probable or even as possible in a not remote future, the Liberal party is in no danger of disruption. The instinct of self-preservation will save it from such a catastrophe. It will not be cajoled into performing the "happy despatch" by the persuasions or the prophecies of its adversaries. The Whigs are too cautious and the Radicals too sensible to push their differences, under the circumstances of the time, to extremities; there is no fear but that they will find a *modus vivendi*, as they have done in the past, so also in the future; the retirement of Mr. Gladstone will make no alteration in their relative strength, and can therefore scarcely affect their position one towards the other.

But it will, no doubt, considerably affect the relative positions of the Conservatives and the Liberals. Mr. Gladstone is a force—a power—the exact value of which in the political equation it is difficult to estimate. He has been the backbone of his party—the tower of strength on which it could always depend, and which has never failed it. The foremost orator of the day—nay, of the century, for we hold him superior even to Canning, the first financier, the best statist, his loss cannot but be severely felt by those whom he has so long led and so often led to victory. The ministry will be seriously weakened by his withdrawal. It cannot replace him. Already it has suffered severe losses by the resignation on various grounds of several of its most prominent members—as Mr. Bright, the Duke of Argyll, Lord Lansdowne, and Mr. Forster. The single important gain that has accrued to it since its formation—that of Lord Derby—is far from counterbalancing these defections. Lord Derby is a sensible man, a good man of business, and a hard worker. But he is no orator, no originator of new ideas, no political genius. The Cabinet as originally formed in 1880 included at least three men of genius—Mr. Bright, Lord Selborne, and Mr. Gladstone. Should Mr. Gladstone retire it will possess but one; and he is precluded by his position as Chancellor from holding the office of Premier. The adversaries of the ministry will characterize it, so soon as Mr. Gladstone is gone, as “a Cabinet of humdrums,” and it will be difficult to say that there are no grounds for the designation. The Conservatives will be able to show on paper an array of names quite as respectable, quite as brilliant, as those which will remain on the ministerial list when that of Mr. Gladstone has ceased to adorn it.

Still, we see no reason to expect that the loss of strength to the ministry and the ministerial side will be such as to place them at their adversaries' mercy. The present Parliament contains so large a majority of Liberals that neither elections nor individual caprices can make any important change in the balance of parties within the walls of St. Stephen's. The world at large may safely count on the continuance of a Liberal ministry in power, so long as the present Parliament continues. And it need not be dissolved until 1887. England's policy at home and abroad is therefore likely to remain unchanged for the

next three years. That policy may be briefly summarized as consisting in the maintenance of amicable relations with foreign powers by abstention from all acts of an aggressive or provocative character, in the encouragement of colonial freedom and self-development, and in the progressive adaptation of laws and institutions at home to the needs of a continually changing society. Some enlargement of the county franchise and some redistribution of seats must necessarily take place ere long, since both sides are pledged to it; but no transference of political power to new and untried classes, no fresh "leap into the dark," like that taken in 1867, is to be apprehended. Practical measures of an administrative character, such as the reform of the Corporation of London and of the City Companies, simplification and codification of the law, rearrangement of County Government, reorganization of the Revenue Departments, Cathedral Reform, and Ecclesiastical Courts Reform, will probably occupy the main attention of the government during the remainder of the present Parliament's existence. Revolutionary changes will scarcely be introduced by a ministry whose leading spirit will be either the heir to a dukedom and £200,000 a year, or an earl of the mild and moderate character of Lord Granville, or a baronet of ancient descent, sound legal training, and old Whig principles, the brother of a large landed proprietor, and the grandson of an archbishop.

Beyond the termination of the present Parliament any forecast that can be made must be in the highest degree conjectural and problematical. He must be a bold man who would venture to predict what will be the verdict of the constituencies at the hustings of 1887. For one thing, it is wholly uncertain who the electors will be, since the question of the County Franchise is one of those with which the present Parliament is certain to deal. And even if we assume that the new electors will be of very much the same mind as the old, it is impossible, since the experience of 1873 and 1880, to anticipate what that "mind" will be with any confidence. For our own part, looking to the facts, first, that every government commits mistakes, and that its accumulated mistakes are brought up against it and thrown in its teeth at a general election; second, that every government makes enemies, and that its enemies all look forward to dealing it

a kick on that occasion ; and, third, that the new electors will be mainly from a class deriving its subsistence from the land, and therefore likely to vote with the landed interest, we are inclined to expect the return of the Conservative party to power in the year 1887. We may, of course, be mistaken. The new electors, having the protection of the ballot, may yield to the seductions of agitators, and give their votes against the farmers and the landlords. They may throw their weight into the Radical scale. In that case the new Parliament would probably be even more Liberal than its predecessor, and the party now in power would have a fresh lease of life for another *septennium*.

GEORGE RAWLINSON.

THE COLLEGE OF TO-DAY.

[A supposed address before citizens of the city of Hygeia, proposing to found a college.]

IN this new city, at the junction of two great rivers, where the iron highways of the land meet the highways of the water, destined by nature to be the centre of a great industrial community and the depot of a great internal commerce, and dedicated by you in wise forethought to the health and best life of that portion of mankind which shall here make its dwelling,—you desire to crown and complete your wholesome system of free education with an institution which shall offer to your youth the opportunities of the higher learning and, by at once centralizing and radiating a wise culture, shall conduce to the intellectual health and wealth of your community.

And the first question that meets you is: Is it wise to do this at all? are the most of people better citizens and better men and women for possessing this higher culture?

Now it must be admitted that a college can do harm and that culture may be a bad thing. Not a true college or a noble culture, mind you. But it has become an axiom among philosophers that the finer a thing is the more vile is its corruption. Also, a tool is the worse for being a good tool, if it be used for bad ends. The finest skill in moulding and tempering steel may be put into a burglar's jimmy. So then if culture be but a carping and inactive criticism, in the nature of a chronic and irremediable disease that sees the world only through jaundiced eyes, and if a college produce this culture, it is unutterably a bad thing that you should found such a college and possess such a culture. If your college is to sap the vitality of men, to wither their brains by spring-forcing, to make them know so much that they avail nothing, to send forth graduates who

are a perpetual sneer at their less learned betters, then let us have no colleges. But are we thus to slap civilization in the face, and because animals can run into evil courses, become vegetables which cannot? This indeed amounts to throwing up the game of life and admitting that the world is worse off the older it gets; we will take to the woods, and play innocently again with our fathers, the monkeys. I do not so read the Bible, or history, or Mr. Darwin; indeed, it is the business of the true culture to point out the landmarks that verify progress, to add to the experience of the individual the experience of the race, to prove that no effort is possible without its result—and no result possible without effort; to send the young man out into life equipped to make a place in it, and with faith which shall never grow old that whatsoever of good, however humble, he puts into the world shall abide in it forever. That there are college weaklings, as there are weaklings everywhere, is not to be denied; but it is the purpose and mission of the true college to add “strength to strength.” Its graduate is to be a wider man, of deeper resource; if a farmer, a better farmer, at all events a better citizen and a better man. So far as this result is not produced, it is the fault of the man himself, of training that is bad instead of good, or of the social and political conditions into which he emerges. Some of these elements in a present difficulty we may not at this moment consider, but let us here agree that it is not culture but its abuse that is at fault. In a word, the question is not, Shall we have colleges? but, Shall we have good colleges? It is resolved just here into, What kind of college shall we have?

It is well to bear in mind, first of all, that as a part of general education you want a college, and that you do not want a university. I use the words not in their historical sense, in which the college was one of the halls of the university, nor in their etymological sense, in which college means a body of men, particularly students, collected together, and university a place where universal learning, the circle of the sciences, is taught, but in the modern sense into which they are clearly differentiating. According to this view, looking upon the university as a collection of special schools, including also, it may be, a general one, the college is the place where one goes to learn “something

‘about everything,’ and the university where one goes to learn, in this or that of its professional schools, “everything about something.” We may keep this in mind by the fancied etymology that college means a collection of knowledge and university the turning of all knowledge to one end. In this sense the great schools of this country—Harvard, Yale, Columbia, Princeton, Michigan—are universities, with the peculiarity of having as their originating centre each a college proper. (Harvard in particular, with its elective courses, attracting older men who are already A.B.’s of other colleges, is becoming really a university, and its methods are to be discussed accordingly.) Now there is no objection to this, except it be the tendency in these great institutions, desiring to make all the use possible of the great scholars who as university professors centre there, to confound the college course with the university, as by the adoption in their colleges proper of this very system of elective studies; but there is an objection, brought out clearly by this distinction, to the colleges, on the other hand, attempting to be universities. This is one of the weaknesses, perhaps the one weakness, which brought obloquy upon the “fresh-water colleges,” and particularly the small colleges of the West. They were pretentious, for one thing,—a high school was often a State University,—whereas the first duty of scholarship is to be honest and modest; and they set their graduates the bad example of attempting to seem more than they were. It is the business of a college to be a college and of a university to be a university; and we shall see that while, from the nature of things, there is need of and can be, worthily, but few universities, great and rich centres, there may be colleges everywhere, so long as they are not so small or so poor as to be ill fitted for their work.

The university, to quote again a happily put *dictum* of education, is to teach everything about something; that is, the professional schools of which it is composed are to do this for their respective students. For this purpose a great centre of learning is needed, with great facilities, where specialists will reside and where great libraries and museums may be collected. The professional schools unite for this. Hither comes the man of general education to aim himself for his special work in life, and

here he selects the courses and masters best fitted to give him the technical education he requires. His fellow-collegian, not dedicated to the learned professions or to special science, goes meanwhile to the farm, if he is to be a farmer; to the machine-shop, if he is to be a mechanician; to the counting-room, if he is to be a business man—each, when he enters his special school, better qualified because of his college education to succeed in his peculiar calling. The college does not aim; it makes ready the gun to fire true when it is aimed. It completes general culture, by teaching everything about something. It takes the young man before he is ready to do something in particular and makes him ready to do anything in particular. In particular, let me emphasize, not anything or something in general. It is peculiarly necessary, therefore, that the college should recognize and enforce from the start, what the university man must see for himself, the limitations of human knowledge. If you will go into the woods and throw yourself down by the first hand's breadth of turf, and consider for a few moments the infinite play of life that there is about it, the putting forth of the leaf, the flitting of the insect across it, the dew and the winds that water and tend it, you will learn for yourself that there is more in the smallest segment of nature than a lifetime of man's infinite mind will suffice to know. A cursory examination of the tariff bill will teach the same thing as regards trade. This is the first lesson that must be learned. It is indeed impossible to learn everything about however small a something, or very much about anything. The college, then, must refrain from attempting to teach too much, else it will succeed only in teaching nothing. But a well-educated man needs to know at least the general relations of all knowledges; full equipment and concentration are the keys to happiness and success. The college gives one, the university the other. This discriminates at once between the work of two classes of teachers: the university professor of chemistry, a great chemist, teaches his students to be in some measure chemists; the college professor of chemistry, or the department in which chemistry is included, perhaps not a chemist at all, teaches his pupils the general principles of the science, its relations to other sciences and to life, and uses its methods toward the general development of the intellects .

under his charge. The college course is a general education; the university course is a special education.

Now general education is a question of the subjects to be taught, special education is a question of the person to be taught. The one depends on what is known, the range of present knowledge, which is not an individual matter; the other depends upon personal choice of a life specialty. A chief purpose of the general or college education is to afford that comprehensive view of the world of knowledge and activities which shall enable the student to make intelligent choice of the special field to which his tastes lead him and for which his personal qualities fit him. But what this general education should be, he has not the means to decide. Others must determine that for him, and these others must be those already acquainted with the wide field of general knowledge—educated educators. From this point of view elective studies have properly no place in the *college* course; they are an infusion of the university idea into the college, and they have the decidedly bad effect of encouraging the American tendency to “save time” by crowding general education into fewer and fewer years so as to put the boy “at his work” at the earliest age possible. It is a heritage from the old idea that to become a good merchant a boy must not go to college, but begin by sweeping out the store. We give little enough time for preparation as it is, without college authority for the forcing process. It is of course alleged, as the plea for these elective studies, that they are intended to prevent forcing, to save the student from attempting many things he cannot do, that he may do well the one thing he chooses to do. But this is at once a surrender of the principle of general education, a confession that knowledges have already increased beyond our powers of classification. The elective system is the device, in fact, for eluding the difficulties of a transitional period, in which knowledge has taken a surprising leap, so that we don’t yet know how to handle the new results. But the key is given in the simultaneous growth of that power of analysis and generalization which, selecting only typical details, displays the more clearly the great principles and relations of arts, sciences, and letters. The history of the world can yet be written in one volume, and more satisfactorily than of old; tho with our present accumulation of facts no number

of volumes can fully cover a single administration. Our dilemma imposes a difficult task upon the governors of our colleges, but let us not admit that a man can no longer be well educated.

The duty imposed upon the college, then, is one of self-limitation on the one side and approximate completeness on the other. But let us not be charged with forgetting that education is something more than knowledge. Knowledge in itself is naught; it is useful only when applied as wisdom. It is more important that a man's mind should be a good tool than that it should be a wide storehouse. That is just the design of the college course. The extreme classicists look with alarm upon the incursion of the natural sciences, because they fear that in the multiplicity of subjects studied there will be no opportunity for thoroughness in any one. Their mistake lies in forgetting that thoroughness is not a quantity, but a quality. Nothing more influences the development of character and the direction of activity, personal or national, than the methods of thought; the philosophers of England have been perhaps quite as effective in her material development as her legislators. It is all the more important, therefore, that the methods taught shall not be one-sided, that the scientific method and the literary habit shall be placed side by side. And as far as thoroughness is concerned, as to use, no one requires it more than the physical experimentalist; as to training, it depends after all more upon the teacher than upon the subject or the quantity of it taught. We may all agree, then, that the well-ordered college must open the store-house of general knowledge, furnish the key to its treasures, and teach their proper use; it must, in other words, impart general principles, inform as to the sources of detailed knowledge, and train to correct methods of thought.

The main question, then, between large and small colleges is the sufficiency of the faculty to cover the wide field of general knowledge. The organization and relation of departments is the matter of prime importance, and if a college cannot command sufficient income to insure equipment in each, it must give way. The new college has this advantage over the old, that while the latter holds to the traditional division of departments that existed when natural science was only knocking at the door, the former may map out its division lines in view of

the new and splendid acquisitions. In the light of the new demands and the old experience, the faculty of the average college may perhaps be best mapped out as follows :

- { Law—a proper chair for the President.
- { Historical Sciences.
- { Social Science and Metaphysics.
- { Art.
- { English—which may include the office of Librarian.
- { Ancient Languages.
- { Modern Languages.
- { Mathematics.
- { Mixed Sciences.
- { Natural Sciences.

This scheme suggests, with the minimum number of chairs, a comprehensive classification of the subjects of study, in logical divisions. It recognizes three great groups, of what may be called social, philological, and natural knowledges.

Upon the efficiency of the President depends the harmony and the completeness of the college work, and his chief care therefore should be neither teaching nor police duty, but the exercise of his executive skill. A great educator will make his college great in its results and single in its workings without interfering with the individuality of the several instructors. And without the central control of a capable man, the college will lack the essential unity that should characterize it. The activity of present investigation is so constantly adding facts to each department of knowledge that each professor is as constantly pressing for more of the student's time, altho his peculiar function is so to generalize these new facts into principles that he may take less. In this continuing emergency, as well as in the many relations in which departments or professors trench upon each other, it is the President who must hold the even hand of control and balance, while he takes means to bring the efficiency of each professor up to the standard of the highest by the improved methods he may suggest from one class-room to another. It is for him also, following the example of a distinguished American college president, to show to the students themselves

the relations of the special departments of the curriculum to their general education.

It is the President who must, more than any one person, give its tone to the college, as Arnold did to Rugby; he must be the shining example of the educated gentleman, the "whole man," the man of knowledge, of enthusiasm, of moral force, who can inspire younger men and to whom they may aspire. To such presidents the American college system already owes much; nor can any man desire a higher life-work than earned for one college president the sobriquet, quite as much in earnest as in kindly jest, of "Mark, the perfect man."

Your wise choice of a president, therefore, will be a first condition of success. Take care, when he is chosen, that his office is not hampered by the petty details of an officer of police. Take care also that he is left otherwise free for his higher work. He cannot be everything else and the president too. But there is one department of teaching, requiring a *minimum* of the professor's and of the student's actual time, yet whose influence might be made the most vital, of which he may well assume the chair,—the department of Law and political (not economic) science. In this department he may best prepare the student to become a well-ordered thinker and a good citizen. In the general sense of the word law, it would be his function to infuse the young mind with the sense of the universality of law, of the relations of natural laws underlying and harmonizing the several departments of knowledge, and of the necessity of conforming the intellectual and moral powers, by the cultivation of habit, to those fundamental laws by whose aid man reaches his highest development, against which man must gain but a losing victory. By such teaching the President may open the way for the highest usefulness of each department, and establish the most direct influence on the development of his students. He voices the highest results of the science and philosophy of our day, which concentrate their teachings in the one thought of the unity of law.

The importance of the study of law in its specific sense, especially of the history of law, has been too much overlooked in our colleges. Meanwhile most of our law schools, training men technically to become lawyers, have also subordinated that

general and historical view of law which should properly form a part of general education. Yet the forms of law have been one of the most important factors of social development, and one of the most influential agents in determining methods of thought. The educated man should certainly know the facts and the reasons of the development of "customary" law as the rule of earlier communities; its gradual supercedure by the invention of statute law; the wonderful influence of Roman law, the law of codified abstract principles, applied by the deductive method, in all modern thought; the English system of "case law," following the inductive method, which is in direct competition with code law in the States of our own Union; the relations of law and equity; the growth of law by judicial and professional interpretation in accordance with the current development of institutions; the rise and progress of international law; and the other phases of law which have made part of him as he is, and which underlie the facts he reads in his daily newspaper. All this might be taught in a very small proportion of the college time, and yet it is now scarcely taught at all.

Following the same line, the work of this chair should include political science, giving the college alumnus that practical acquaintance with the growth of governments which shall enable him to do his part as a voter in mitigating and shaping the "practical politics" of the day. There is nothing more important to this country than that a large educated class should recognize the truth that government, of a great country or of a petty village, can progress only in the direction of accord with the social and economic conditions which produce it, and the instinct of the practical politician which recognizes this principle by leading him to use "the materials at command" gives him an immense advantage over the *doctrinaire* who refuses to read past history or present facts. The educated man, again, ought to know how government has developed from the patriarchal to the constitutional form, and the relations of government to society in typical countries; the rival bases of government, the basis of family, or race, at the foundation of ancient peoples, the basis of territory, or property, at the foundation of modern states, still producing conflicts which appear in to-day's journals under the guise of "the Eastern question," or

discussions whether taxes should be laid on persons or on property; the constitution of his own country, in its practical workings as well as in its legal theory, and the comparison it calls for with the constitutional system of England; the historic view of the principles and work of parties whose conflict has produced our political history and the status of to-day. All this is quite possible without dangerous partisanship, and it would do much to make the college alumnus an intelligent citizen.

The Chair of Historical Sciences should cover a vastly wider field than the old professionship of history, and it is perhaps not too much to say that its methods should be diametrically opposite to the old methods. It may now almost be called the chair of the comparative sciences *par excellence*, so all-powerful has the comparative method become in their development. It should include comparative philology, the key to history and the necessary introduction to the useful study of specific languages; something of comparative mythology, and, finally, comparative history itself, traced from primeval man and ancient society through its manifold development into "to-day." It is not dates that are wanted—a dollar's worth of chronological dictionary can give them much more usefully than any memory—but the key to them. Properly taught, History is the experience of the race added to the experience of the individual—an inspirer of faith, the key to progress.

The Chair of Social Science and Metaphysics is, in its first-named division, closely connected with the chairs already named, and the three together afford an excellent example of the necessity of Presidential control, which shall establish lines of demarcation and prevent controversy between the several departments. In none of these departments are views absolutely settled; but while students should be fully warned of this fact, and thus taught to develop individual judgment, it would be most unfortunate to find professors of differing views waging war over mooted points in the border lines between their respective fields. Social Science properly deals with general laws for which history furnishes the facts and principles. It is a still higher generalization, an abstraction from the philosophy of history. This includes, of course, economics (or political economy), on the teaching of which, especially in a commercial, self-taxing ..

community, too much stress can hardly be laid. In the present view of metaphysics, that department resolves itself into the teaching of the history of thought, and the chief demand to be made of the teacher is that he should present fairly, from the point of view of the author and under the light of modern discovery, the great systems of secular and theistic speculation; from the savage's simple conceptions through the magnificent dreams of Plato to the Evolution philosophy which colors the sunlight of the present day. It is in this department that the training in method of thought, *i.e.*, Logic, has also place.

The Chair of Art is on debatable ground. Yet I suppose it will not be denied that a man is not fully educated unless he has made some acquaintance with the flower as well as with the roots of human activity, not to speak of the enlargement of the faculties of observation and enjoyment which art knowledge gives. The student should be taught, by lectures and by display of or direction to examples or copies, at least the principles, the history, and the great achievements of the graphic and plastic arts, of architecture, and, I should certainly say, of music, for the name and work of Beethoven has been of some importance in the world. It is manifestly impossible, however, that practical education in these arts, which must be an individual matter, should form part of the general education of the college. The rule still holds good, that the relations of any one art or science to general culture, rather than the practice thereof, are the concern of the college. An exception might be made in the case of drawing, altho this should properly be sufficiently pursued in the school. It is now generally acknowledged that knowledge of art is an essential part of a completely educated man; and so far as elementary practice is essential to that knowledge, it should somewhere be given.

The Chair of English, including language and literature, is of far more importance than most of our colleges have recognized. Half a generation ago there was no such department, except in one or two pioneer colleges. But the intellectual and practical importance of thorough training in the full knowledge and accurate use of our own tongue, and of acquaintance with the treasures of its literature, is becoming more and more recognized with each year. It is in this department that the

modern ideas of education are revolutionary from the old. Grammar, the analysis of speech for the discovery of its laws, was considered one of the elementary studies; it is now known to belong properly to the advanced stage of education. The child learns correct speech by imitation and correction, not by the study of laws, which should be a part of elementary education only in so far as they are necessary to elucidate and assure practice. The child's attention should therefore be directed chiefly to those external features of language to which its senses naturally open; it is observation, memory, the sense of rhythm and other beauty that should first be trained, by reading, the repetition of prose and verse, and by talk, which is the first step in composition. This basis being obtained in the schools, the college is ready to introduce the student to the analytical study of language. He must know the relations of his mother tongue to other languages; its direct origin in the Anglo-Saxon, whose elements should be given him; the derivation of its words, with the careful training in synonymy which is alike the key to accurate thought and certain expression; the laws of its construction, grammar, and its departures from "general laws"; the science of expression, rhetoric; the history of the development of the language in its literature, and, finally, a philological knowledge of its authors and their leading works.

Within the province of this chair come also several auxiliary departments, notably composition and oratory, the latter, of course, requiring for its practice a specially trained instructor.

The Professor of English naturally holds also the Professorship of Books and Reading insisted on by Emerson, and, even tho the college organization permits a separate keepership of books, should be in the relation of the library to the students, the Librarian. Otherwise that important office is apt to be a keepership and nothing else, whereas it should serve one of the most important functions of the college. It is of course the business of each professor to acquaint his students with the literature of his department, and to stimulate a knowledge of these books; but a general officer is also needed, who shall fulfil the high office which the leading librarians of the day recognize as theirs, the development of taste in reading, of the easiest methods of actual work, and of a practical acquaintance

with books as the keys to knowledge. It is an essential feature of the proper use of the college library that the students, under reasonable restrictions, should have access to the books themselves, to the shelves. This helps to make the scholar a man commanding the sources of knowledge. It would be useful also if the librarian should make the library to some extent his instruction room, advising personally and particularly acquainting the student, through the methods and literature of bibliography, with the means of searching the world over for the books or book he may need.

The Chair of Ancient Languages and Literature is of course concerned chiefly with Latin and Greek, the fountain-heads of our present secular culture, and without which, despite elective systems, no man can rightly be called a scholar. Let us not, in the conflict between ancient scholarship and modern science forget this, nor let us, on the other hand, overlook the fact that to speak or to write Latin or Greek is no necessary or desirable part of general education. Philological training is as important as, and no more important than, scientific training; and it must not be forgotten also that philological training has been in good part transferred to the domain of English. English synonymy is more important than Greek accentuation; yet we still need to be trained in the subtleties of expression best exemplified in the Greek aorist. The college knowledge of these tongues should include a reasonable (reading) acquaintance, especially with their laws of construction, through grammars and the authors selected as text-books, and a general knowledge of other authors connected with the development of the literature and life of Greece and Rome. The world will never grow so old that it can forget Plato, and yet, in a college paying not a little attention to long-since-forgotten details of Greek orthography, a student may scarcely more than hear of Plato. This is no true scholarship. The Chair of Ancient Languages should also, taking up the work from the department in which philology is taught, give an outline view of that magnificently organized tongue, the Sanskrit, the mother tongue of our mother languages, and of that other speech, the Hebrew, which connects us with another family of tongues and is the language of our earliest Sacred Books.

The Chair of Modern Languages and Literature must also recognize its limitations. Spain, Italy, and other modern countries have their languages, and the student should know where they belong, the character, relations, and great names of their literatures, and thus place them in his general scheme of culture; but instruction must chiefly be confined to the great representatives of the Latin and Teutonic branches which flow together into our own tongue, *viz.*, French and German. The construction of these languages, and their literatures, should be treated of fully, and, while the college cannot be expected to make expert conversationalists in French or German, it is natural and proper that living languages should to some extent be studied in practical speech. Here, as in English, one of the most useful methods, at the same time storing the mind with enjoyable treasures, is the committing and recitation of noble verse.

The Chair of Pure Mathematics must be relied upon for that exact training possible only in the exact sciences. Its teaching deals not with things, but with symbols, and, as a process of abstract reasoning, its study requires a mind well advanced into the reasoning age. On the other hand, the observation of form, upon which geometry is built, is one of the first things to which the mind opens, and we need a portion of mathematics, arithmetic and much of algebra, early in the course of education, as a key to knowledge beyond. Between which lies this truth, that the facts and properties of form as shown in ocular demonstration should be a part of the earliest education of the child, preparing him for the rational and exact proof left to the college; that the use of figures, especially on the metric system, and algebraic symbols, including the practice of logarithms, taught much as the child learns the use of language, should be placed, for practical purposes, as early as possible, leaving to the college the higher development of both. The college course should then include the higher algebra, arithmetic in the rationale of logarithms; geometry, plane and spherical, in its analytic relations, and trigonometry; and the science of the calculus, taught on the newer rationalistic basis. At the head of this department should be a patient and exact man, representing to the student the absolute certainty of mathematical method, anxious to satisfy honest inquiry to the utmost detail

of exact proof, and not satisfied himself until his students are satisfied. That half-teaching which has been too common in the pure mathematics, surrenders the entire value of mathematical discipline.

The Chair of Mixed Sciences has the special function of linking together the most abstract and most practical results. Its educational work consists in proving this connection. It is the linking professorship. It applies the processes of mathematics to the facts of physics, and thus discovering and developing the great laws which control the universe, applies these in turn to practical usefulness. Its work is the great proof to practical minds of the direct value of science and education. So far as these have not been previously provided for in education, it teaches the facts of physics, static and dynamic,—sound, light, heat, and electricity, in their relations to their source and to the human apparatus, and physical astronomy. The scientific study of acoustics, optics, etc., and of analytical astronomy, follows, in association with the final triumph of the mathematics, the analytical mechanics, which presents the equation of the universe. The application of mathematical principles in surveying and navigation and in the constructive (descriptive) geometry, the teaching of which associates itself, however, practically with the art department, concludes its work. Here must be a man who combines with breadth of generalization a keen sense of practical adaptation.

The Chair of Natural Sciences teaches observation, classification, and induction. It deals with inorganic matter and its transmutation into organic life, through the round of chemistry, geology, botany, zoology. The facts of these the child should be led to teach himself, by observation and simple experiment; the college work should complete the collection of typical facts, induce comparison, arrange classification and discover law. The department needs representative collections and satisfactory tho simple apparatus; and the student, in qualitative and slightly quantitative chemical analysis, and in the analysis of plants, should essay for himself acquaintance with scientific methods. I know in my own experience of no more useful college study, in cultivating habits of observation and careful judgment, than that of blowpipe analysis, conducted by

the professor at the cost of a few inexpensive specimens and reagents, and an apparatus of a watchglass and a clay-pipe.

Such a curriculum, indeed, fulfils the round of knowledge, the circle of the sciences; but it is met at once by the severe criticism of practiced and working teachers, that it is theoretical and ideal, and not practical and possible. It is quite impossible, they object, to "cram" so much into the limited course of the average student. Prof. Jevons has already entered protest against the use of this word "cram" as a weapon against all innovations, and it may fairly be replied also that much of the memorizing of insignificant details under the existing system is "cram" of a sort to which the word should be applied with obloquy. But the premises of these critics are entirely correct. It is true that, however knowledge grows, human nature and capacity, at least for any immediate term of years, remain much the same. We must make concessions to human limitations and imperfections. Above all things, let us not increase "the noble army of smatterers,"—those aimless unfortunates who are "jacks of all trades and good at none." Let us not overlook the fact that wisdom is above knowledge, that training is at least as important as learning in the purpose of the college, and that concentration is the final condition of success in life. In these premises, which are fundamental principles, all must agree. It is in their application that the mistake of the criticism lies. The natural conservatism of the professional mind misconstrues the nature of the proposed change. It is not proposed to increase the amount of mental exertion, but rather by re-arrangement and better adaptation to decrease it. Details are omitted here, that principles may be taught there, and under well ordered generalization, founded on typical facts obtained during the early years of observation, culture becomes more complete and training more instead of less thorough. Each process of development, each method of reasoning, becomes a part of the mental outfit, and thus the well-trained mind possesses a comprehensive and well-organized plan, in which every after-acquired fact, law, or experience may be assigned to its proper place and be the more easily assimilated by association.

A second criticism asks whether the college ought, by demanding so much, to narrow the range of those who may enjoy

its benefits; whether it should not give a less complete education to more people. This brings us face to face with the at present difficult problem of the relations of the college to the general education out of which its curriculum must proceed. It is noticeable that while there has been much activity in the improvement of the higher education, and much progress, following the suggestions of Froebel and Pestalozzi, in primary education, the intermediate education remains much where it was, and blocks the road in the middle. Our common schools are still "grammar schools," altho, as has been noted, educators are in agreement that "grammar," as such, is the one thing that should not be taught until the very highest grades are reached. And the colleges cannot do their proper work, nor can an approximately correct curriculum be put into practice, until many features of the middle schools are not only reformed but revolutionized. The scheme of the proper education, following the child from its first lessons, should be developed in view of two chief conditions: the order in which the natural development of the mind fits it for the reception of successive studies; the practical fact that, since the number to be educated decreases each year beyond the early years, the essential subjects must be presented early in the course. Happily these two conditions largely coincide. The present curriculum of the middle schools has developed from the practical recognition of this last condition, in ignorance of the first, but through much misconception as to which are essential subjects. It is, of course, important that every child should be taught to speak, to write, to read, to figure, correctly; but it is now known that the child learns correct speech, for instance, chiefly through its observing faculties, by imitation, and not through its reflective faculties, by study of grammar. The child develops through the what, the how, the why—first the fact, next its relations, lastly its causes; and yet the lower schools will be teaching the laws of grammar, and leaving the facts of nature, as the elements of botany, for which the child-mind is hungering and thirsting, to the advanced student. The college professor of the natural sciences, for instance, should find the foundations laid for him when the student enters college, whereas now he

must begin at elementary facts. A correct college curriculum is scarcely possible as middle education stands now.

Recognizing, then, the fact that the order in which the mind can best learn is the order in which it can best be taught, it becomes of the utmost importance that the college, admitting the necessity of present compromise, should exert its full influence to reorganize the education below. It must compel a high standard in the lower schools by the quality of its entrance examinations, for their sake as well as its own. The best baking cannot make good bread of poor dough; and if the dough is rejected, the mixers will be more careful how they work up the flour. The college will do no service by admitting ill-prepared youth—no service to them, certainly none to any one else. It is its business to act in general education as the controlling head—as the governor of the steam-engine.

The plan of the college is of great importance; but of still greater importance, practically, is the question of its theory and methods in its relations with students, their discipline in conduct and study. There are two opposing systems. The one considers the student still a boy, hedges him about with close paternal government, stimulates him with merit-marks for successful study, and punishes him with demerits for ill-conduct; ranks him by examinations, rewards him with prizes dependent on his marks, and sends him out with a certificate of excellence. The other patterns the freedom of the German universities (which do not correspond to our colleges), would treat the student as a man responsible only to himself, permits him to be present or absent at his choice, and otherwise regards him as a free and independent American citizen. The one argues that the student must be trained to enter the world through close supervision and with immediate motives in view; the other believes that he must learn before he enters the world that he must depend on himself. The tendency of professionalized teachers is to follow the first system; and it must be admitted that the liberal innovators who have reached out toward the freer method have often been sadly disappointed in the practical results. Their students did not accept the responsibility. But perhaps their failure came because they threw themselves upon an ideal method, not modified to conform to actual condi-

tions. The truth is that the American college-student is both boy and man; he comes in, a boy, with very little sense of responsibility, and yet he is often qualified to vote long before he takes his degree. The college, receiving him a boy, should send him forth a man. And it should treat him in view of his transitional character during this period. The college theory of discipline should contemplate an increasing development of responsibility during the successive college years. You cannot successfully appeal to public opinion unless there is a public opinion to which to appeal; and the failure to recognize this truism has been the cause of the disappointment of many liberal educators who have trusted to a sense of responsibility before they have taken any pains to develop such a sense. And yet the unmitigated paternal government, with its fallible infallibility, into which college methods often return after spasmodic attempts toward a better system, has, it seems to me, been a great curse to this country. College-students, removed from the associations through which they would naturally develop into political activity, are subjected, just as they approach the age of political responsibility, to a system of paternal government which, by practically assuming all the responsibility itself, destroys the sense of individual responsibility. "College politics," for this reason, often become notoriously corrupt, the field of mere bargaining among cliques; and the college alumnus is prepared to take "rings" as a matter of course, and to assume that air of *blasé* do-nothingism which has brought culture into disrepute. While, on the one side, our colleges have trained numbers of men to enter usefully into public life, they must, on the other, be arraigned for causing much demoralization. And now that our earlier training-schools, as the New England town-meeting, are losing their educational function, and the flower of our youth are more and more seeking our colleges, this matter becomes of inestimable importance.

What, then, are the relations which shall develop responsibility? First, the central college authority must be absolute and autocratic; but it should never be necessary to exert its absolute power. It should represent to the student that absolute and inflexible natural law against which the man in active life throws himself in vain, which opposes to him the abso-

lute resistance of a wall of rock against which the headstrong can only be dashed to pieces. This is the most important lesson the young soldier in life can learn—the absolute necessity of obedience to moral and physical law. Let him be kindly spared, by this apprentice training, the severe penalties which unforgiving Nature must otherwise inflict. Now it is the misfortune of any paternal government that, in undertaking to do everything, it betrays itself into a network of inconsistent mistakes, which involve it in constant and weak compromise with individual cases and belittle all ideas of law. Moreover, Nature does not intrude her law. It is felt only when a man runs against it. Nature never “nags.” The college authority, then, should be exercised seldom if ever; but it must be exercised, when need comes, with rigorous inflexibility, tempered by forgiveness only as far as mercy can safely temper justice.

Secondly, this necessity of absolute law should be forestalled by concentration of the governing power upon the development of the sense of responsibility. If an upper-classman has not a sense of responsibility which may be practically appealed to, I say boldly that it is somehow the fault of the college authorities. You cannot at once expect it in under-classmen, just out of the school leading-strings. Arnold of Rugby defended, against a public opinion strong in his day and overwhelming now, the two English abuses of whipping and fagging. Why? Because they seemed to him a part of his one purpose—the development of a true responsibility instead of a false independence. His younger boys were yet boys, and he kept them dependent as fags upon the sixth-form scholars, that they might call forth the sense of responsibility in his upper men, who were responsible only to him. It was his way of saying that “the leaders lead.” If the sixth form did not support him, he used to say, he must go. But they did support him. He had created a public opinion which never failed to honor his appeals. And what he did in modelling Rugby school according to English responsible aristocratic government of his day, needs to be done in our colleges in accordance with our system. The students should be in the main self-governing, as Fellenberg made his boys. Demerit-marks—a fine levied in the college currency—may be necessary in the lower classes, but there should be

steadfastly developed a student-feeling which may be trusted to take upon itself the punishment of misconduct, either by tacit public opinion or in some organized method, as a wrong done to the student-community. The superfluous energy which now finds its escape to the cost of the weakest disciplinarian of the faculty might then be absorbed by finding "an object in life." Kindred questions admit a like solution. Prizes and marks, considered as achievement, instead of the symbol of achievement, are bad: here is the root of that common distemper which confounds money with wealth. This is a matter, again, of student public opinion; and student public opinion should be within the reach of the faculty, if the faculty be wise. Examinations, it may be added, stand on a basis of their own, useful for the grasp of subject a general review imparts, but still more because they represent to the student, as Prof. Jevons has pointed out, those crises in life in which all that has gone to make the man finds at once its test and its opportunity—supreme moments, it may be, in which the whole life finds its focus. Their influence may be the more important when no marking system has preceded them, since there is nothing more vital than that a man should learn to conduct his daily life in view not of immediate but of ultimate ends.


A college thus widely planned, officered by men who can inspire as well as teach, with a student-body self-disciplined and eager for advancement, cannot but be a blessing to any community by whom liberality is fostered. The student-body in particular, neither rioters nor young prigs, should be as helpful as now often it is harmful. And the faculty should give it, and the community, their help and their example. They should be a band of working scholars, not hesitant to take their part in outer life, and eager to instruct and inspire beyond the limits of their class-rooms. It is for them to bind together with their influence the microcosm of student-life and the macrocosm of the outer world.

Such an institution will not fail to produce for us that temper of mind, derided rather than encouraged by a culture less wise, in which efficient work must find assurance; the temper which results from those cardinal virtues of the soul—reverence, enthusiasm, and faith. These, and the need of them, a

wise training, catholic and wholesome, must emphasize. That grateful reverence which finds in the less favored but fruitful past the seeds from which the happier present flowers—a reverence venerating age; that responsible enthusiasm well ordered to direct its divine desire for the present help of humankind—an enthusiasm honoring manhood; that patient faith, the prophetic reward of daily toil, which sees in an assured future the ever-perfecting fulfilment of this imperfect yet sufficient present—a faith recognizing in every child the possibility of the supreme man;—such reverence, such enthusiasm, such faith are the fruit and the seed of a true culture, vital to progress and to the welfare of mankind.

R. R. BOWKER.

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